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SECOND-TRIMESTER ABORTION DANGERTALK
GREER DONLEY * & JILL WIEBER LENS **
This Article is forthcoming in Vol. 62 of the Boston College Law Review. Draft
as of Aug. 27, 2020. Feedback welcome!
Abstract: Abortion rights are more vulnerable now than they have been in decades. This Article focuses specifically on the most assailable subset of those
rights: the right to a pre-viability, second-trimester abortion. Building on Carhart v. Gonzales, where the Supreme Court upheld a federal ban on a safe and
effective second-trimester abortion procedure, states have passed new secondtrimester abortion restrictions that rely heavily on the woman-protective rationale—the idea that the restrictions will benefit women. These newer secondtrimester abortion restrictions include bans on the Dilation & Evacuation
(D&E) procedure, bans on disability-selective abortions, and mandatory perinatal hospice and palliative care counseling in cases of life-limiting fetal conditions. This Article discusses the paternalism and traditional gender stereotypes underlying these newer abortion restrictions and uses empirical studies to
discredit the woman-protective rationale justifying them. The Article also suggests a radical, new response to claims that women need protection from second-trimester abortion: the embrace of second-trimester abortion “dangertalk.”
First introduced in medical literature by abortion providers, dangertalk refers to
the uncomfortable truths about abortion that supporters often avoid. These topics include the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures and the emotional complexity that can especially accompany second-trimester abortion.
This Article advocates for greater openness about these topics, arguing that silence only capitulates the narrative of second-trimester abortion to those opposing abortion rights. The Article envisions second-trimester abortion care that
better recognizes these realities and provides women with more choices that
might make second-trimester abortion easier, including alternative procedures
and the option of memory-making to process difficult emotions, like grief. Finally, this Article argues that more transparency about these difficult subjects
will help rebut the woman-protective rationale used to justify second-trimester
abortion restrictions.
© 2021, Greer Donley & Jill Wieber Lens. All rights reserved.
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INTRODUCTION
The death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett renew and inflame existing fears about the future of
abortion rights in the United States. Many are reasonably worried about the
fate of Roe v. Wade, 1 as interpreted by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 2 given that the newly composed Supreme Court recently announced that it will hear a case that challenges its central holding. 3
The case, Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Dobbs, involves a ban on
abortion after fifteen weeks, before the fetus is viable. 4 The Court granted
certiorari on the very broad question of whether all pre-viability abortion bans
are unconstitutional. That Roe and Casey prohibited pre-viability bans is the
very reason that numerous lower federal courts have found other second-trimester abortion restrictions unconstitutional. For instance, lower courts have
held unconstitutional state bans on a second-trimester abortion procedure
known as Dilation and Evacuation (D&E) 5 and state bans on abortion due to
fetal anomaly. 6 If the Court in Dobbs concludes that some pre-viability abortion bans are constitutionally permissible—as many suspect it will—the constitutionality of these other second-trimester restrictions is immediately in
question. 7
Numerous state laws specifically target second-trimester abortion even
though it is rare in the United States—less than seven percent of abortions
occur after thirteen weeks of pregnancy. 8 Women 9 need second-trimester
1

410 U.S. 113, 164–66 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992).
2 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992).
3 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in
part, 2021 BL 181590 (U.S. May 17, 2021) (No. 19-1392).
4 Id.
5 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 2020 WL 6551717 (6th Cir. 2020),
cert. granted in part, 141 S. Ct. 1734 (2021); but see Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 2021
WL 3661318 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding Texas’s ban on the D&E procedure constitutional). See
generally Mary Ziegler, What’s Next for Abortion Law?, BOS. REV. (Sept. 1, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/politics-law-justice/mary-ziegler-whats-next-abortion-law
[https://perma.cc/YE6U-LQXM] (discussing the future of abortion laws in the United States).
6 See Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 940 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2019), vacated pending rehearing en banc, 944 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 2019).
7 Id.
8 CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, CDC (last updated Nov. 25, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm (citing data from 2018); see
also infra Part I (discussing occurrence of first- and second-trimester abortions).
9 Trans men also need reproductive healthcare, including abortion. Many reproductive
justice scholars are moving to adopt gender neutral language when discussing reproductive
health in recognition of this fact, which we support. In this particular paper, however, we have
opted to continue using gendered language because so much of our argument relies on gender
stereotypes that are hard to capture and discuss without a reference to gender.
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abortions for a variety of reasons: a later discovery of pregnancy, changed
circumstances after an initial decision to keep the pregnancy, the need to save
money for the procedure, or a fetal or maternal health condition discovered
during pregnancy. 10 Adolescents, women with less education, and Black
women are more likely to need second-trimester abortions. 11 Despite its rarity, second-trimester abortion consumes enormous attention in the abortion
debates, and public support for abortion in the second trimester drops dramatically. 12
Perhaps the largest anti-abortion victory in the last twenty years is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 which affirmed a federal
ban on a safe second-trimester abortion procedure known as Dilation & Extraction (D&X). 14 Underpinning the Court’s decision was the idea that the
D&X was so “gruesome” that women would suffer emotional distress and
regret if they later learned the specifics of the procedure.15 Importantly, this
victory was not simply limited to the legal realm—the campaign also successfully reduced public support for abortion generally by inundating Americans with pictures of fetal parts and intentionally evocative descriptions of
second-trimester abortion procedures. 16
Carhart entrenched into law the idea that women need protection from
abortion procedures. The woman-protective rationale remains the argument
of the most sophisticated anti-abortion advocates. 17 It attempts to nullify Casey’s fundamental assumption that abortion benefits women, freeing the
Court to overturn abortion precedent. The rationale is also important because
of its legitimizing role—reframing abortion restrictions as protective, not

10

See infra Part I (discussing the reasons women obtain second-trimester abortions).
Id.
12 Lydia Saad, Trimesters Still Key to U.S. Abortion Views, GALLUP (June 13, 2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/235469/trimesters-key-abortion-views.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NAZ9-WACF]; David Crary & Hannah Fingerhut, AP-NORC poll: Most
say restrict abortion after 1st trimester, AP News (June 25, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/only-on-ap-us-supreme-court-abortion-religion-health2c569aa7934233af8e00bef4520a8fa8.
13 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
14 See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text (providing overview of D&X procedure).
15 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159–60.
16 See infra notes 87–91 and accompanying text (discussing political success among the
anti-abortion activists on restricting access to D&X abortions).
17 MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM.: ROE V. WADE TO THE PRESENT 143–45
(2020).
11
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harmful, to women. 18 The architects of the anti-abortion movement have always believed that they could “chang[e] hearts and minds” if they could convince the public that abortion harms women. 19
This Article describes how anti-abortion activists are once again using
the woman-protective rationale to justify recent second-trimester abortion restrictions—bans on the D&E procedure, bans on abortions based on fetal
anomaly, and requirements to inform women of perinatal hospice and palliative care programs after the diagnosis of fetal anomaly. 20 Building on legal
scholarship critical of the woman-protective rationale, this Article exposes
the paternalism and gender stereotyping behind these more recent secondtrimester abortion restrictions. 21 We also use studies of women’s abortion experiences to debunk claims regarding abortion restrictions as a means to best
protect women’s psychological health. 22
Despite the inaccuracies and sexist stereotyping inherent in the womanprotective rationale, it remains intuitive to many—especially in the context
of second-trimester abortion, when the uncomfortable realities of second-trimester abortion seem to increase the alleged need to protect the woman. In
Carhart, Justice Kennedy admitted he had no evidence to support his conclusions about women’s regret, yet he still concluded that women needed protection from a safe medical procedure. 23 This intuitive presumption is compounded by abortion precedent that gives state legislatures wide discretion to
consider “medical uncertainty” and reach a conclusion at odds with the medical establishment.24 As a result, evidence-based arguments refuting the
woman-protective rationale may not be effective in court.
We thus propose a new strategy for supporting second-trimester abortion rights—a radical reconceptualization of abortion dialogue in the United
States. Our proposal builds on the pioneering work of abortion providers who

18

See infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text (discussing the woman-protection rationale and its role in upholding laws that restrict abortion access).
19 ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
145.
20 See infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text (discussing the woman-protection rationale and bans on certain abortion procedures).
21 See infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning behind allowing abortion restrictions and the paternalism and gender-stereotyping inherent in the
woman-protective rationale).
22 See infra notes 271–396 and accompanying text (discussing relevant empirical studies
that debunk the woman-protective rationale).
23 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007); See also Terry A. Maroney, Emotional
Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 901 (2009).
24 Id. at 163; see also infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text (discussing states that
have passed abortion restriction laws with the reasoning that women need protection).

2021]

lens_donley DRAFT

5

introduced the concept of “dangertalk” to describe open dialogue about uncomfortable abortion truths. 25 Our Article introduces the concept of abortion
dangertalk to legal scholarship and expands its reach. In particular, we focus
on two dangertalk subjects related to second-trimester abortion. First, we discuss the unique nature of the second-trimester abortion procedure, which is
“visually and viscerally different” than first-trimester abortion because it involves “removing what looks like a fully formed small baby” instead of a
“microscopic fetus and gestational sac.” 26 Second, we note that women can
experience a broad range of emotional responses to abortion, especially later
abortions, including negative emotions, like grief. The abortion rights movement often avoids public discussion of these dangertalk subjects because of
the fear that it could hurt the movement in litigation and the public narrative. 27
We argue that avoiding these truths does not protect abortion rights. To
the contrary, the silence capitulates the narrative to the anti-abortion community, which has exploited it to its own advantage. We suggest that the uncomfortable truths about second-trimester abortion, including the specifics of second-trimester abortion procedures and the complexity of women’s emotions
concerning abortion, should be met head on by the broader abortion rights
movement and discussed openly. Though many abortion providers deal with
these topics in their daily practice, they remain hidden from the canonical
pro-choice discourse. Embracing abortion dangertalk should disarm the antiabortion, woman-protective narrative surrounding second-trimester abortion
regulations—a narrative suggesting that women would not have chosen an
abortion had they been better informed. We also argue that it will improve
patient care. Greater openness on these topics would allow providers to more
systemically offer patients options that could increase their autonomy and
improve the abortion experience. Although these frank discussions come with
risks, we think the benefits outweigh them.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explore why women need
second-trimester abortion, contradicting common assumptions made about
women who need this care. 28 In Part II, we describe recent popular second-

25 See generally Lisa A. Martin et al., Dangertalk: Voices of Abortion Providers, 184 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 75 (2017) (providing an overview of the concept of dangertalk in the healthcare
field).
26 Lisa H. Harris, Second Trimester Abortion Provision: Breaking the Silence and Changing the Discourse, 16 REPRO. HEALTH MATTERS 74, 76 (2001).
27 See Martin et al., supra note 25, at 80 (discussing healthcare providers’ and activists’
apprehension toward dangertalk because of the potential for anti-abortion advocates to negatively scrutinize it).
28 See infra notes 32–68 and accompanying text.
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trimester abortion laws: bans the D&X and D&E procedures, bans that outlaw abortion based on certain (or all) fetal anomalies, and laws that mandate
perinatal hospice and palliative care counseling. 29 In Part III, we undercut the
state’s claims that these laws benefit women and expose the paternalism and
gender stereotyping behind these restrictions. 30 In Part IV, we argue that embracing dangertalk will both rebut the woman-protective rationale and improve abortion care. 31
I. THE NEED FOR SECOND-TRIMESTER ABORTION
A typical pregnancy lasts forty weeks and is divided into three trimesters. 32 Though one might assume the first week of pregnancy starts at
conception, doctors typically date pregnancies to start on the first day of a
woman’s last menstrual period. That means women are considered two weeks
pregnant at conception, and are at least four weeks pregnant when a pregnancy test can first detect the pregnancy. The first trimester lasts the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy. The second trimester extends from fourteen weeks
to twenty-seven weeks of pregnancy. The third trimester extends from
twenty-eight weeks until birth, which usually occurs around forty weeks. 33
Although the vast majority of abortions in the country occur during the
first trimester, not all do. Using the most recent data from 2018, 92.2% of
abortions were performed in the first trimester, 6.9% were performed at fourteen to twenty weeks’ gestation (the first half of the second trimester), and
1.0% were performed at twenty-one weeks or later (the second half of the
second trimester or later). 34 Even though these second-trimester abortions are
rare, they are villainized. In 2021, only 34% of Americans said that abortion
should be legal in most or all circumstances in the second trimester, compared

29

See infra notes 69–186 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 271–396 and accompanying text.
32 How Your Fetus Grows During Pregnancy: Frequently Asked Questions, AM. COLL.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS, https://www.acog.org/womens-health/faqs/how-your-fetusgrows-during-pregnancy [https://perma.cc/6KQF-ZQVD].
33 Id.
34 Katherine Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2018, MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARY 6 (Nov. 27, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/ss/ss6907a1.htm [https://perma.cc/N8VS-3KNS];
see also Rachel K. Jones & Lawrence B. Finer, Who Has Second-Trimester Abortions in the
United States?, 85 CONTRACEPTION 544, 544 (2012) (noting that only 9–10% of abortions
occur in the second trimester); Later Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/later-abortion [https://perma.cc/2WMWDQE9] (discussing that roughly only 1% of abortions occur at or after twenty-one weeks).
30
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to almost twice as many (61%) who said it should be legal in most or all
circumstances in the first trimester. 35
A variety of reasons exist why women need abortions after the first trimester. 36 As one might expect, women who obtain second-trimester abortions
may discover their pregnancies later than women who have first-trimester
abortions. 37 Historically, confirmation of pregnancy did not occur until
“quickening”—a woman’s first feeling of fetal movement—which does not
occur until at least the second trimester. 38 Today, however, there is a common
societal view that women are “in tune” with their bodies and have control
over their fertility, suggesting that women know—or at least should know—
they are pregnant, even early on. 39 Moreover, enhanced technology surrounding pregnancy detection, such as home tests and ultrasounds, entrench the
notion that women can, and should, detect their pregnancy even earlier. As a
result, women who fail to discover a pregnancy until after the first trimester
are often perceived as irresponsible. 40
The normalization of early detection, however, is based on assumptions
about early pregnancy that are not always true. It is important to note at the
outset that nearly half of pregnancies in the United States—an incredibly high
proportion—are unintended. 41 When women are not trying to get pregnant,
they are often not tracking their periods, making it harder to recognize if their
menstrual cycle is late. 42 Furthermore, many women who become pregnant
may have no symptoms, experience bleeding during the pregnancy that they
mistake for their period, have irregular periods, or are using birth control
35 Crary & Fingerhut, supra note X. This number was higher than a poll in 2018, which
found that only 28% of Americans thought that abortion should be legal in the second trimester. Saad, supra note 12.
36 See ACOG, Second Trimester Abortion, 121 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1394, 1394
(2013) (describing the various circumstances that can lead to second-trimester abortion).
37 Diana G. Foster et al., Predictors of Delay in Each Step Leading to an Abortion, 77
CONTRACEPTION 289, 290 (2008); see also Diana Greene Foster & Katrina Kimport, Who
Seeks Abortions at or after 20 Weeks?, 45 PERSPS. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 210, 212–14
(2013) (explaining that women were also more likely to need an abortion after twenty weeks
if they discovered their pregnancy late (at twelve weeks, on average)).
38 Carrie Purcell et al., Women’s Embodied Experiences of Second Trimester Medical
Abortion, 27(2) FEMINISM & PSYCH. 163, 167–68 (2017).
39 Id. at 167.
40 See id. at 172 (“Participants were acutely sensitive to how a later discovery of pregnancy
might appear to others.”).
41 See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states
[https://perma.cc/P72B-W3D7] (noting that between 2001 and 2011, almost half of pregnancies in the United States were unplanned).
42 Cleveland Clinic, Can you be Pregnant and not know it?, (Nov. 7, 2019)
https://health.clevelandclinic.org/can-you-be-pregnant-and-not-know-it/
(advising
that
women track their cycles to be better aware of the possibility of pregnancy).
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when the pregnancy occurs, all of which mean the woman has no reason to
suspect pregnancy. 43 Obesity, lack of nausea and vomiting, and unawareness
of last menstrual period also make it difficult to detect pregnancy and are
significantly associated with delays in obtaining an abortion.44 In addition,
women with less education are more likely to discover a pregnancy late,
likely due to a dearth of reproductive health education. 45 For example, in a
study of European women who had abortions after sixteen weeks of pregnancy, two-thirds of the participants did not learn of their pregnancy until
after twelve weeks. 46 “For some, this was because they were using contraception, had recently had a baby, had irregular periods, or were otherwise not
expecting to be pregnant.” 47 As a result, a first trimester abortion was almost
immediately not an option.
Once the pregnancy is discovered, women who terminate in the second
trimester also frequently suffer other delays due to the lack of certainty about
whether to terminate, difficulties saving money for the abortion, and long
travel distances (more than fifty miles) to an abortion facility. 48 Women who
need abortions after twenty weeks are more likely to live more than three
hours from an abortion facility. 49 For many, the logistical burdens imposed
by long-distance travel, including public transportation, childcare, and time
off work, can be daunting. 50 Moreover, the second-trimester abortion procedure often takes two to three days, with many states also having waiting periods that add another day’s worth of travel, childcare, and expenses.51 And
because second-trimester abortions are complicated to perform, fewer providers offer them, making access difficult for many women. 52 Putting this all
together, if a woman does not discover her pregnancy until months after it
begins, and then needs weeks or more to decide whether she wants to terminate, save the necessary money for the procedure, or plan the logistics associated with long travel, she will inevitably need a second-trimester abortion.
Some second-trimester abortions also occur in intended pregnancies.
For instance, women who make the initial choice to continue their pregnancy,
43

Purcell et al., supra note 38, at 167.
Foster et al., Predictors of Delay in Each Step Leading to an Abortion, supra note 37,
at 290, 292.
45 Jones & Finer, supra note 34, at 549.
46 Purcell et al., supra note 38, at 171.
47 Id.
48 Foster et al., Predictors of Delay in Each Step Leading to an Abortion, supra note 37,
at 289–90; Later Abortion, supra note 34.
49 Foster & Kimport, Who Seeks Abortions at or after 20 Weeks?, supra note 37, at 212.
50 Id. at 212–15.
51 Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Denial of Abortion Because of Provider Gestational Age
Limits in the United States, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1687, 1687 (2014).
52 Id.
44
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may decide to terminate later when faced with disruptive life events, such as
ending a relationship or losing employment. 53 A woman may also learn of a
maternal or fetal health condition that forces her to consider abortion in a
pregnancy she intended. A study published in 2012 noted that only a small
cohort of participants stated their pregnancies were planned, but those women
were more likely to seek second-trimester abortions. 54 And more than half of
women who had an abortion in an intended pregnancy did so after sixteen
weeks. 55
In the case of fetal anomaly, almost always, the fetal diagnosis will occur
in the second or even the third trimester. 56 Though late first-trimester screening tests exist, the screening tests are not diagnostic, and require additional
testing in the second trimester for confirmation. 57 Furthermore, many nongenetic conditions cannot be diagnosed until an anatomy scan is conducted,
which does not occur until around twenty weeks. 58 Currently, in the United
States, most women who receive a life-threatening fetal diagnosis choose to
terminate. Roughly 80–90% of parents chose to terminate after learning of a
fatal fetal diagnosis, and 60–75% of parents chose to terminate for other lifethreatening fetal diagnoses. 59 Fetal anomalies, however, are relatively rare
and not all women seek testing. As a result, only about 14% of women who
obtained an abortion did so because of fetal health issues. 60
Women may discover an issue with their own health that forces them to
consider termination in the second trimester with an intended pregnancy. 61
For instance, she might be diagnosed with cancer, the treatment for which
should not be delayed, but which could be toxic to the fetus. 62 A woman’s
water could also break early, or the placenta could partially detach prior to

53

Jones & Finer, supra note 34, at 549; see also Purcell et al., supra note 38, at 173
(explaining the “common experience” of a partnership ending as motivation for a woman to
seek second-trimester abortion).
54 Jones & Finer, supra note 34, at 549.
55 Id. at 547–549.
56 Greer Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, 105 MINN. L.
REV. 175, 218–20 (2020).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 184–85, 188.
60 Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal Anomaly?: Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of Prenatal Whole
Genome Sequencing, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 296 (2013).
61 Elizabeth Czukas, Therapeutic Termination of a Pregnancy, VERY WELL FAMILY (Nov.
6, 2019), https://www.verywellfamily.com/reasons-for-therapeutic-termination-2371295
[https://perma.cc/NZP4-HMGC].
62 Min Hee Shim et al., Clinical Characteristics And Outcome Of Cancer Diagnosed During Pregnancy, 59 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY SCI. 1, 6 (2016).
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viability, a time when the baby is unlikely to survive outside of the womb. 63
Either scenario could expose the pregnant woman to infection, hemorrhage,
or other risks. 64 A pregnancy could also exacerbate other pre-existing health
conditions that threaten a woman’s health before the fetus is viable. 65 In these
instances, a woman may be in the unexpected position of considering termination.
Age, race, and class are highly associated with a woman seeking a second-trimester abortion. Women were more likely to need a second-trimester
abortion if they are adolescents, lack a high school degree, or rely on health
insurance to pay for the abortion. 66 A 2012 also study concluded that black
women, women with less education, and “those who had experienced three
or more disruptive events in the last year” were more likely to have an abortion at thirteen weeks of pregnancy or later. 67 As a result, additional restrictions on second-trimester abortion will disproportionately affect poor
women, women of color, and young women.
Despite the myriad reasons that women need second-trimester abortions, anti-abortion activists have targeted these abortions for regulation as
part of their broader agenda of ending abortion. In the section below, we describe some of the most common second-trimester abortion laws that have
surfaced in the last few decades. 68 We later link them to the larger anti-abortion strategy of defending abortion laws by claiming they are necessary to
protect women.
II. TARGETING SECOND-TRIMESTER ABORTION
Although women need and have second-trimester abortions, public acceptance of abortion drops significantly after the first trimester. More than
sixty percent of Americans support abortion in most or all cases in the first
trimester, but only thirty-four percent felt the same in the second trimester. 69
63

See Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56, at
217–18 (discussing the time of viability as beginning around twenty-four weeks of pregnancy).
64 Id. at 186.
65
Abortion Can Be Medically Necessary, ACOG (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.acog.org/news/news-releases/2019/09/abortion-can-be-medically-necessary
[https://perma.cc/79AY-ERX4].
66 Jones & Finer, supra note 34, at 546.
67 Id. at 544. The study defined disruptive life events as “falling behind on rent or mortgage, unemployment of a month or more, separating from a partner, having a baby, moving
two or more times, having a serious medical problem, having a friend or family member with
a serious medical problem, death of a close friend, being the victim of robbery or a burglary
or having a partner incarcerated.” Id. at 546.
68 See infra notes 69–186 and accompanying text (discussing recent restrictions on abortion access).
69 Crary & Fingerhut, supra note 12.
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All abortion restrictions, from waiting periods to mandatory counseling,
affect second-trimester abortion, but a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion
in the second trimester is specifically limited in a variety of ways. Under both
Roe and Casey, the state can legally prohibit abortion after viability—the
point at which the fetus could likely survive outside of the womb. 70 Because
fetuses grow at slightly different rates, the determination of viability requires
a case-by-case analysis of each fetus, but usually occurs around twenty-four
weeks of pregnancy. 71 Thus, states are free to prohibit late second-trimester
abortion, and the vast majority prohibit abortion at this point or earlier.
Twenty states ban abortion at “viability,” and four states ban abortion at
twenty-four weeks. 72 Many other states ban abortion earlier in the second
trimester—arguably before viability. For example, seventeen states currently
ban abortion at twenty-two weeks and one state has an active twenty-week
ban. 73 Since May of 2019, after Justice Kennedy retired, conservative states
have tried to ban abortion even earlier in the pregnancy, from conception to
eighteen weeks. Some lower courts have held that laws banning abortion between fifteen and twenty-two weeks are unconstitutional, but not all.74
In May 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case involving
Mississippi’s fifteen-week abortion ban, agreeing to hear argument on
“whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional.” 75 This question involves a direct challenge to the central holding from
Roe and Casey—that the state cannot prohibit any woman from obtaining an
abortion before viability. 76 Dobbs foreshadows a Supreme Court willing to
dive into the abortion controversy and reshape abortion rights jurisprudence.
70 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 163–64, (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
71 Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56, at
217–18.
72 Id.
73 State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions
[https://perma.cc/34AX-AAJV].
74 See Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56, at
221 (discussing examples of some states, such as Arizona, North Carolina and Utah, that
attempted to ban abortion early in the second trimester).
75 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in
part, 2021 BL 181590 (U.S. May 17, 2021) (No. 19-1392).
76 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 (1992). All of the lower
courts who have considered the issue have held these pre-viability abortion laws unconstitutional. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 951 F.3d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2020); SisterSong
Women of Color Reprod. Justice Collective v. Kemp, 472 F.Supp.3d 1297, 1302 (N.D. Ga.
2020); Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc., v. Parson, 389
F. Supp. 3d 631, 630 (W.D. Mo. 2019); Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 394 F. Supp. 3d 796, 804
(S.D. Ohio 2019).
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And if the Court holds, as is expected, that pre-viability abortion restrictions
can be constitutional, the contours of that holding will likely be fleshed out
most immediately in cases involving the second-trimester abortion law restrictions discussed in this Article. In particular, recent en banc circuit decisions upholding Texas’s D&E abortion ban and Ohio’s Down Syndrome
abortion ban—both of which created a circuit split—are perfectly teed up for
the Supreme Court to consider next term. 77
This Article focuses on restrictions based on “how” the doctor would
perform the second-trimester abortion and “why” the woman sought the second-trimester abortion. More specifically, we focus on laws that ban the Dilation and Evacuation (D&E) and Dilation and Extraction (D&X) surgical
procedures and abortion restrictions related to fetal anomaly. These restrictions are part of the long-term, anti-abortion strategy of slowly chipping
away at abortion rights over time. By drawing attention to more controversial
abortions, the hope is to degrade support for abortion rights generally. Courts
analyze the constitutionality of all abortion laws, included the ones we highlight below, under the undue burden test from Casey, which asks whether the
law places “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability.” 78 The Sections to follow in this Part discuss
restrictions on various abortion procedures, how they fit into the anti-abortion
strategy, and the status of litigation concerning them. Section A provides an
overview of restrictions on D&X procedures. 79 Section B describes similar
efforts related to the D&E procedure. 80 Section C discusses disability-selective abortion bans. 81 Last, Section D explores mandates on counseling for
women after receiving a fetal diagnosis. 82
A. D&X Bans
One of the most successful anti-abortion campaigns over the past quarter century was the movement to ban a second-trimester abortion procedure
called D&X. 83 This procedure allowed physicians to remove the fetus whole,
making fewer passes through a woman’s cervix with instruments that could
potentially damage the uterus, and therefore reduce risks. To allow the fetus
77

Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, Case 2021 WL 3661318 (5th Cir. 2021); 994 F.3d 512,
535 (6th Cir. 2021).
78 Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
79 See infra notes 83–104 and accompanying text.
80 See infra notes 105–131 and accompanying text.
81 See infra notes 132–157 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 158–186 and accompanying text.
83 See ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 152 (describing the D&X campaign as a “political godsend” for leading anti-abortion
groups).
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to be removed whole, the D&X involves partially delivering the fetus in a
breech (feet first) position, and emptying the contents of the skull, so that it
can collapse and safely pass through the cervix.84 Typically, the fetus would
die during the procedure, but fetal demise could also be initiated beforehand
with either an injection or by cutting the umbilical cord. 85 The D&X procedure was used not only in abortion, but also for miscarriage or stillbirth management in the second or third trimester.86 The only difference in these situations is that the fetus would have died on its own before the D&X began.
Anti-abortion activists dubbed this procedure “partial birth abortion”—
a non-medical term that stuck and even made it into subsequent legislation. 87
This term had a large impact in framing the debate—it allowed opponents of
the D&X procedure to make comparisons to infanticide and “draw upon the
powerful mental images and emotions evoked by birth.” 88 The term incorrectly suggested that D&X procedures were performed on healthy, full-term
babies, when in reality, the vast majority of D&X abortions occurred before
viability. 89 In large part because of this framing, not only did the anti-abortion
movement succeed in gaining a nationwide D&X ban, which was upheld by
the Supreme Court, but it also dramatically influenced public opinion. 90
Within a few years, Americans supporting legal abortions “under all circumstances” fell by nearly a third, from about thirty-four percent to only twentytwo percent. 91
The abortion rights community did not initially anticipate the controversy surrounding the D&X procedure because it was a new and rarely used
procedure. 92 But once state and federal bans were enacted, the predominant
84 Id. at 150, 152; Rigel C. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Political and Moral Battle over
Late-Term Abortion, 10 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 397, 403 (1998).
85 Soc’y of Fam. Planning, Induction Of Fetal Demise Before Abortion, 81 CONTRACEPTION 462, 463 (2010).
86 See Gabriela Weigel et al., Understanding Pregnancy Loss in the Context of Abortion
Restrictions and Fetal Harm Laws, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/understanding-pregnancy-loss-in-thecontext-of-abortion-restrictions-and-fetal-harm-laws/ [https://perma.cc/57R6-7YHF] (“D&X
can be used in abortion but also in stillbirth management if the intact stillborn is desired by the
family for personal reasons (religious, burial ceremony, etc.) or medical reasons to assess
cause of death.”). In the United States, pregnancy loss before twenty weeks is called miscarriage, and loss after twenty weeks is called stillbirth. About Stillbirth, STAR LEGACY FOUND.,
https://starlegacyfoundation.org/about-stillbirth/ [https://perma.cc/47QU-JT3Y].
87 Oliveri, supra note 84, at 406–07; SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, WHO LIVES, WHO DIES,
WHO DECIDES? 181 (2018).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
91 See ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 156 (discussing the ruling’s effect on public opinion).
92 Id. at 152.
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strategy to oppose them was to focus on their lack of a health exception. 93 It
became a tactical decision to focus entirely on a small subset of women who
had a D&X abortion: women who terminated after learning of a severe fetal
diagnosis. 94 There were some advantages to focusing on these cases—the
women were relatable to those in positions of power as they were often white,
educated, married, already mothers, and carrying wanted pregnancies. 95 This
strategy was effective early on in the debates, and even led to President Clinton vetoing two bills because they lacked a health exception. But the strategy
later backfired when the public learned that the majority of D&X abortions
occurred outside of this context—meaning most women who received a
D&X were not doing so because of a fetal anomaly. Critics have also suggested that this tactic of focusing on fetal anomaly abortions reinforced notions of the “good” abortion and villainized women who obtained a D&X due
to other reasons. 96
Soon after President George W. Bush was inaugurated, he signed into
law the federal “Partial-Birth Abortion Act,” which lacked a health exception. 97 Abortion rights activists were optimistic that the Supreme Court would
invalidate the law—after all, the Court had recently invalidated a nearly identical state law in 2000, albeit by a 5–4 margin. 98 But by the time the federal
law reached the Supreme Court in 2007, President Bush had nominated two
new members to the Court, including, most importantly, the replacement of
Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito. The anti-abortion community had recently started incorporating arguments that women who had abortions regretted their choice, including amicus briefs from regretful women, which became a part of the legal strategy defending the D&X ban. 99 In Gonzales v.
Carhart, the Court upheld the federal ban, distinguishing its previous decision on narrow grounds with a 5–4 majority that included Justice Alito.100
The federal D&X ban is still on the books today, and many states also
have passed their own D&X bans, using similar language. 101 Notably, the
93

Oliveri, supra note 84, at 413.
Id. at 414; ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 161.
95 Oliveri, supra note 84, at 420, 430.
96 Id. at 424, 430.
97 18 U.S.C. § 1531.
98 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000).
99 ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
173-75.
100 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007); see ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN
AM., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 177 (discussing addition of Justice Alito
to the Supreme Court and its effect on anti-abortion case rulings).
101 Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester, GUTTMACHER INST.
(July 1, 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/bans-specific-abortion-methods-used-after-first-trimester [https://perma.cc/4YF6-TWVH].
94
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federal ban only applies when the D&X is performed on a viable fetus. 102 As
a result, providers could continue to perform D&X abortions if they induced
fetal demise beforehand, although the law caused a chilling effect that makes
any D&X procedure essentially non-existent. 103 The D&X ban still left
women with the ability to obtain abortions, just with a procedure other than
the D&X. Not all anti-abortion activists were happy with this litigation strategy, which devoted enormous resources to passing and defending a law that
did not prevent any abortions. 104 The campaign was nevertheless successful
at shifting the abortion debate to the right by focusing public attention on the
uncomfortable details of an abortion procedure.
B. D&E Bans
Given the success of D&X bans, anti-abortion legislatures have recently
passed state laws that ban the most common type of abortion procedure in the
second trimester: D&E. Unlike a D&X procedure, a D&E abortion does not
remove the fetus whole, but instead requires the provider to make multiple
passes into the uterus with instruments to remove the fetus in parts. 105 The
woman’s cervix is typically dilated over the course of hours or days before
the procedure. 106 The D&E is also used for management of second-trimester
miscarriage and some early stillbirths. 107 Like the federal D&X ban, state
D&E bans usually apply only to D&Es performed without fetal demise beforehand.
Eleven states have tried to ban D&E abortions, but the ban is only active
in two jurisdictions: Mississippi and West Virginia.108 Litigation is ongoing
in many more states. It is clear that anti-abortion groups are pursuing the
same strategy that was effective in banning the D&X. “Taking a page out of
the playbook of the successful ‘partial birth’ campaign, anti-abortion oppo-

102

18 U.S.C. § 1531.
EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 87, at 199.
104 ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
175 (explaining anti-abortion activists’ frustration with “incremental restrictions”).
105 Oliveri, supra note 84, at 445.
106 Id.
107 See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists & Soc’y for Maternal-Fetal Med.,
Obstetric Care Consensus: Mgmt. of Stillbirth, 135:3 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
e110, e122–23 (2020) (explaining that D&E is available for stillbirth in the second trimester
and may be safer than induction of labor, which often also still requires a D&E to remove the
placenta). But see About Stillbirth, supra note 86 (listing a D&E as a common procedure after
miscarriage, but not stillbirth).
108 Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester, supra note 101.
103
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nents have given a grotesque-sounding nonmedical name to” the D&E: dismemberment abortions.” 109 Though only 6.9% of U.S. abortions occur after
the first trimester, roughly 95% of them are completed with a D&E. 110 If this
method were banned, abortion providers would be left with only two remaining options for second trimester abortion: abortion through labor and delivery
(induction abortion) or inducing fetal demise before a D&E or D&X. 111
The first option, induction abortion, is neither popular nor widely available. 112 As the name suggests, induction abortion requires a woman to labor
and give birth. It typically takes days of induced labor before the fetus will
be delivered, and in one-third of cases, the woman will still need surgery to
remove the placenta. 113 As a result, induction abortions are more time-consuming, invasive, painful, and expensive than D&E abortions. 114 But perhaps
most importantly, they are also more dangerous: 30–43% of women who had
induction abortions experienced complications, compared to only 5–10% of
women who had D&Es. 115 Induction abortions are also less accessible because only a handful of clinics offer them; otherwise, women they must be
performed in a hospital. 116 Eleven states go so far as to ban abortions in public
hospitals. 117 And even in states where hospital abortions are allowed, most
do not provide abortions—either for practical considerations or moral objections—and the cost can be prohibitive for most women. 118

109

DAVID S. COHEN & CAROLE JOFFE, OBSTACLE COURSE 201 (2020); see also Megan K.
Donovan, D&E Abortion Bans: The Implications of Banning the Most Common Second-TriPOL’Y
R.
35,
36
(2017),
mester
Procedure,
20
GUTTMACHER
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/article_files/gpr2003517.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G9AA-YV8Y] (discussing potential effects of banning D&E abortion procedures).
110 Kortsmit et al., supra note X; Donovan, supra note 109, at 35.
111 Id. at 37.
112 Id. The women who choose it are typically carrying wanted pregnancies and wanting
the opportunity to meet their baby and say goodbye. Id. If a woman desires a fetal autopsy,
she must also undergo induction abortion. Id.
113 Kate E. Pettit et al., Improved Safety of Second Trimester Dilation and Evacuation
Versus Induction of Labor in the Management of Fetal Demise or Termination, AM. J. OB&
GYNECOLOGISTS,
https://www.ajog.org/action/showPdf?pii=S0002STETRICS
9378%2816%2931180-2 [https://perma.cc/G54G-BD4S].
114 Id.
115 Id.; see also Soc’y of Fam. Planning, Labor Induction Abortion in the Second Trimester, 84 CONTRACEPTION 4, 6 (2011) (discussing higher complication rates in induction procedures versus D&E procedures).
116 COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 209–11; Soc’y of Fam. Planning, Labor Induction
Abortion in the Second Trimester, supra note 115, at 7.
117 COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 209.
118 See Varvara B. Zeldovich et al., Abortion Policies in U.S. Teaching Hospitals, 135
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1296, 1299 (2020) (describing differing policies surrounding
hospital abortions in teaching hospitals across the United States).
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The other option requires a provider to induce fetal demise prior to the
abortion. Fetal demise can be initiated by injecting the fetus with a medication that stops its heart (either through the woman’s abdomen or cervix) or
by tying the umbilical cord, thus cutting off the fetus’s oxygen source, before
the D&E. 119 The former adds an unnecessary procedure that creates additional patient risks, including infection, cardiac arrest, and hemorrhage in the
woman. 120 This procedure also increases the cost, time, and pain associated
with the abortion. 121 Though the latter can often be completed at the beginning of the abortion procedure, making it a cost-free and less invasive alternative to initiate fetal demise, it is not always technically possible because
fetal position can make it impossible for the physician to reach the umbilical
cord. 122
The Supreme Court will likely determine the constitutionality of a D&E
ban in the near future. 123 Abortion rights activists have argued that these laws
must be unconstitutional because they ban the procedure used for 95% of
second-trimester abortions—in their view, effectively banning pre-viability,
second-trimester abortions altogether in express contravention to Roe and
Casey. 124 There is support for this argument in the reasoning of the Carhart
opinion, where the Court held that states may ban the D&X precisely because
119 Soc’y of Fam. Planning, Induction Of Fetal Demise Before Abortion, supra note 85, at
465–66.
120 Donovan, supra note 109, at 37; see also W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Williamson, 900
F.3d 1310, 1324 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting the risks associated with the procedures used to cause
fetal demise); Blair McNamara et al., A Qualitative Study of Digoxin Injection Before Dilation
and Evacuation, 97 CONTRACEPTION 515, 515 (2018) (describing the increased risks of the use
of digoxin before a D&E, including nausea and vomiting, increased risk of hospital admission
between the injection and the D&E, and the increased risk of extramural delivery (delivery
that occurs outside of a facility intended for childbirth)).
121 Williamson, 900 F.3d at 1327; Kristina Tocce et al., Umbilical Cord Transection to
Induce Fetal Demise Prior to Second-Trimester D&E Abortion, 88 CONTRACEPTION 712, 712
(2013).
122 Soc’y of Fam. Planning, Induction Of Fetal Demise Before Abortion, supra note 85, at
466.
123 See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 2020 WL 6551717 (6th Cir.
2020), cert. granted in part, 141 S. Ct. 1734 (2021) (holding that a ban on the D&E abortion
procedure is unconstitutional); see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 2021 WL 3661318
(5th Cir. 2021) (finding Texas’s ban on the D&E procedure constitutional); Ziegler, What’s
Next for Abortion Law?, supra note 5 (discussing anti-abortion activists strategies to “unravel”
abortion laws in the United States and what the future may hold for abortion rights).
124 See W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Miller, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2017)
(recounting the abortion clinic’s argument that banning the D&E procedure effectively denies
the right to pre-viability abortions in the second trimester); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough
to support a prohibition of abortion . . . .”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)
(“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’
point is at viability.”).
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women would still have access to second-trimester, pre-viability abortions
using a D&E. 125
States have responded that this extra requirement does not actually ban
these abortions, as it only requires the additional step of inducing fetal demise. Therefore, it is no different than laws that mandate waiting periods after
consent or an ultrasound prior to an abortion. 126 Under this argument, the
same reasoning from Carhart applies—women are not prevented from obtaining a pre-viability, second-trimester abortion if they can either have an
induction abortion or a D&E with fetal demise. Thus far, courts have not accepted that argument. Instead courts have held that “fetal demise methods—
their attendant risks; their technical difficulty; their untested nature; the time
and cost associated with performing them; the lack of training opportunities;
and the inability to recruit experienced practitioners to perform them” create
an undue burden, and are therefore unconstitutional. 127 And abortion providers are quick to note that these laws create a slippery slope to more impactful
abortion regulations in the future, like bans on drugs that induce fetal death,
which would then force women into induction abortions. 128
In late summer 2021, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, found Texas’s
D&E ban constitutional. 129 This decision creates a circuit split with the Sixth
Circuit’s prior finding that Kentucky’s D&E ban was unconstitutional, 130 inviting Supreme Court’s intervention. Also, if the Court opens the door to previability abortion bans in Dobbs, the energy behind D&E bans will only
grow. 131
C. Disability-Selective Abortion Bans
Anti-abortion state legislatures are also targeting the reasons women
may choose second-trimester abortions. Over the past decade, sixteen states
have passed laws aimed at banning abortions that are based on the race, sex,

125

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164 (2007) (“Alternatives are available to the prohibited procedure. As we have noted, the Act does not proscribe D&E.”).
126 Id.; COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 202.
127 W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Williamson, 900 F.3d 1310, 1327 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting
similar holdings from all other courts to consider the issue).
128 COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 202.
129 Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, Case 2021 WL 3661318 (5th Cir. 2021).
130 Though the Supreme Court recently granted cert in part, the Court will only consider
a non-merits-based question related to who can defend the state law. EMW Women’s Surgical
Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 2020 WL 6551717 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. granted in part, 141 S. Ct.
1734 (2021).
131 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted
in part, 2021 BL 181590 (U.S. May 17, 2021) (No. 19-1392).
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or disability of the fetus. 132 These laws have been referred to as “reasonsbased abortion bans” as they ban all abortions that are performed for a particular reason. 133 The most successful of the reasons-based abortion bans
have been those that are based on a fetal disability. Because fetal anomalies
are almost always diagnosed after the first trimester, these bans almost exclusively impact second-trimester abortion care. 134 These laws can have intuitive
appeal as anti-discrimination laws, and some notable judges and justices—
including Judge Easterbrook, Justice Barrett, and Justice Thomas—have expressed support for them on that basis. 135 Given the complex history between
the abortion rights and disability rights communities, abortion rights advocates are in a difficult position as they consider how to best object to abortion
bans based on the disability of the fetus. 136
A range of fetal diagnoses may prompt a woman to consider termination.
Many disability-restrictive abortion bans focus on Trisomy 21 (colloquially
known as Down Syndrome) or include a range of anomalies, but often excluding those identified as fatal. 137 But the oldest of these laws—from North
Dakota—is very broad and could be interpreted to include all fetal anomalies,

132 See Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly,
GUTTMACHER INST. (June 28, 2021), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-sex-or-race-selection-or-genetic-anomaly
[https://perma.cc/AXX8-969Z]
(providing an overview of state abortion bans that restrict “specific pregnancy conditions and
populations”).
133 Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal Anomaly?:
Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of Prenatal Whole
Genome Sequencing, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L., 291, 326–27 (2013) (discussing whether the
state or federal government has the authority to ban abortions due to the fetus’s genetic abnormality); Carole J. Petersen, Reproductive Autonomy and Laws Prohibiting “Discriminatory”
Abortions: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 96 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 605, 618–19
(2019) (discussing the ethical and constitutional considerations regarding state laws that ban
abortion because of “sex, race, or disability of the fetus”); Marc Spindelman, On the Constitutionality of Ohio’s Down Syndrome Abortion Ban, 79 OHIO STATE L.J. 19, 32–33 (2018)
(examining a state’s ban on abortion due to the fetus’s Down Syndrome diagnosis.
134 Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56, at
218.
135 See e.g., Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1792 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing that “[i]n other contexts, the Court has been zealous in
vindicating the rights of people even potentially subjected to race, sex, and disability discrimination”); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
917 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (stating that “[u]sing abortion
to promote eugenic goals is morally and prudentially debatable on grounds different from
those that underlay the statutes Casey considered”).
136 Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 587, 626–27
(2017).
137 See Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56,
at 181–91, 222–26 (providing overview of disability-selective abortions bands and describing
fetal anomalies as ranging from minor disability to fatal conditions).
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including the most fatal conditions. 138 These very serious anomalies can be
both genetic (for instance, Trisomy 13 or 18) or structural (for instance, anencephaly or bilateral renal agenesis), though many more exists that are also
(slightly less) life-threatening. 139 These conditions almost always result in
stillbirth or infant mortality, and no child with them has survived to adulthood.
Abortion bans specifically aimed at fetal anomaly are not the only way
in which states ban these abortions. As week-based bans apply earlier and
lack an exception for abortions based on fetal anomaly, they in effect also ban
these abortions. Almost all fetal anomalies are diagnosed in the second trimester. 140 Though women are often screened for certain genetic conditions—
such as Trisomy 13, 18, and 21—late in their first trimester, those tests are
not diagnostic, and the results from the diagnostic test will almost always be
received after fourteen weeks. Non-genetic fetal anomalies are typically not
diagnosed until the anatomy ultrasound around twenty weeks.
Current week-based bans already make it difficult—if not impossible—
for some women to obtain an abortion after learning of a fetal anomaly. And
as state legislatures have tried to move the week-based bans earlier, they have
explicitly found it acceptable that the ban prevents women from terminating
even in the face of a life-limiting fetal anomaly. 141 For example, in Missouri,
anti-abortion advocates have specifically defended the lack of an exception
for life-limiting fetal conditions in its eight-week ban. 142 Arkansas’s ban also
lacks such an exception, with one state legislator noting that the woman

138 14 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1) (West 2013); see also Donley, Parental
Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56, at 183 (discussing the most
severe types of fetal anomalies, often called ”fatal” or ”lethal” and labeled as ”being
incompatible with life”).
139 Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56, at
181–91.
140 Id. at 217–19.
141 Id.
142 See MO. REV. STAT. § 188.056 (West 2019) (preliminarily enjoined by Reprod. Health
Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc., v. Parson, 389 F. Supp. 3d 631, 630
(W.D. Mo. 2019)).
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should continue the pregnancy to enable organ donation—despite its impossibility after stillbirth.143 No court has explicitly considered the constitutionality of a timing-based ban that did not create an exception for fetal anomalies. 144
Before 2021, all courts to consider disability-selective abortion laws
held them unconstitutional under Casey, 145 which held that a state cannot outright prevent any woman from obtaining a pre-viability abortion. 146 The
courts reasoned that disability-selective abortion bans would, by definition,
prevent some women from receiving a pre-viability abortion—those terminating on the basis of a prenatal diagnosis. 147 But the tide is changing. In
2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on a Seventh Circuit case, which
invalidated, as unconstitutional, a law in Indiana that banned abortions based
on fetal diagnoses, such as Down Syndrome and other disabilities, but excluded “lethal fetal anomal[ies].” 148 The Court specifically noted that it was
following tradition by not granting petitions for those that introduce legal

143 Rachel Herzog, House Oks Abortion Ban, ARK. DEM. GAZETTE (Mar. 6. 2021),
https://www.eldoradonews.com/news/2021/mar/06/house-oks-abortion-ban/
[https://perma.cc/6V4V-2MKZ]; see also infra notes 239–240 and accompanying text (discussing some states’ invocation of the woman-protective rationale in prohibiting abortions
based on fatal fetal prenatal diagnoses).
144 Though the issue was raised before the Ninth Circuit, the court did not address it; instead, it held the abortion ban unconstitutional because it banned pre-viability abortions. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Little Rock Fam. Planning Servs.
v. Rutledge, 2019 WL 3323731 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (enjoining enforcement of Arkansas’s eighteen-week abortion ban). For additional background on the issue and arguments raised before
the Ninth Circuit, see Brief of Andrew M. Tobin, Speaker of the Ariz. House of Representatives and Steve Pierce, President of the Ariz. Senate Supporting Appellees and Affirmance,
Isaacson v. Horne, 2012 WL 4086817 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-16670) and Brief for Amici
Curiae Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and Am. Congress of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal, Isaacson v. Horne, 2012 WL
4086817 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-16670). For an analysis of why an exception for fetal anomaly
might be constitutionally required even if Roe and Casey are limited or overturned, see Donley,
Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note X.
145 See Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 755 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (“The
State cannot dictate what factors a woman is permitted to consider in making her choice. The
State’s attempt to carve out exceptions to a categorical right [to pre-viability abortions] where
none exist fails as a matter of law.”); see also Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge,
398 F. Supp. 3d 330, 384 (E.D. Ark. July 23, 2019) (“[T]he State may not prohibit a woman
from exercising that right solely upon the basis on which a woman makes her decision.”);
Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson, 389 F. Supp.
3d 631, 635 (W.D. Mo. 2019) (noting that the State cannot prohibit a woman’s right to obtain
an abortion prior to viability).
146 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion . . . .”).
147 See cases discussed supra note 146.
148 IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-4-1 (West 2021).
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questions that other lower courts have not yet considered. 149 Some lower
courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s language as inviting a circuit
split to consider the issue more fully, 150 especially in light of Justice
Thomas’s fiery dissent in which he expressed his view that the law may be
constitutional. 151 In Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky,
Inc., he reasoned that the law could be necessary to prevent disability discrimination. 152 Judges Barrett and Easterbrook, who heard the case before the
Seventh Circuit in 2018, espoused similar views in their dissent. 153
In April 2021, in Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held Ohio’s Down Syndrome abortion ban—prohibiting a doctor who has actual knowledge that a woman’s reason for obtaining an abortion is due to a fetal Down Syndrome diagnosis—constitutional. 154 It reasoned, oddly, that the law would not actually ban these abortions because
women are not required to tell their doctors about their motivation for the
abortion, nor should doctors assume that a diagnosed fetal anomaly is the
reason for an abortion. 155 Commentators have suggested that this opinion reinterprets the Ohio law as a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy for abortion care. 156
This opinion created the invited circuit split, teeing the case up for the Supreme Court review, but also neutered the law by making it practically unenforceable. Regardless of the Sixth Circuit’s specific reasoning though, if the

149

Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019).
See Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, 389 F. Supp. 3d
at 636 (“While it can be speculated that the Supreme Court’s language in Box implicitly invited
appellate judges to review the merits of prohibitions of discriminatory abortions, any such
invitation was not addressed to district judges.”).
151 See Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1783–93 (Thomas J., concurring).
152 See id. at 1792 (“Enshrining a constitutional right to an abortion based solely on the
race, sex, or disability of an unborn child, as Planned Parenthood advocates, would constitutionalize the views of the 20th-century eugenics movement.”).
153 See 917 F.3d 532, 536 (Easterbrook J., dissenting) (describing the Indiana law at issue—which attempted to make illegal abortions performed for reasons, such as sex, race, or
disability—as a “eugenics statute”).
154 994 F.3d 512, 535 (6th Cir. 2021). The Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio law was not a
ban on abortions based on Down Syndrome. Id. Shortly before this decision, the Sixth Circuit
panel had also allowed Tennessee’s law banning abortions on the basis of Down Syndrome to
go into effect pending the appeal of a district court’s preliminary injunction preventing enforcement. Memphis Ctr. For Reprod. Health v. Slatery, No. 20-5969, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
36780 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2020).
155 Id.
156 Debra Cassens Weiss, Full 6th Circuit Upholds ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Law Punishing
Docs Who Perform Down Syndrome Abortions, ABA J. (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/full-6th-circuit-upholds-dont-ask-dont-tell-law-punishing-docs-whoknowingly-perform-down-syndrome-abortions [https://perma.cc/7DTS-JN6Q].
150
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Court finds in Dobbs that some pre-viability abortion bans are constitutional,
disability selective abortion bans will also receive greater focus. 157
D. Mandatory Counseling After Fetal Diagnosis
Congress and the states have also passed laws mandating that healthcare
providers give pregnant patients information on fetal diagnoses. Some of
these laws are seemingly unrelated to abortion, mandating disclosure of information at the time of diagnosis. One example is the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Act, passed with bipartisan support and which
President Bush signed in 2008. 158 One purpose of the law is to disclose the
latest information on the potential health effects associated with a diagnosis,
including the range of “physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial outcomes.” 159 Numerous states representing both political leanings have
also passed similar laws in order to help parents make informed decisions. 160
Though these laws are far from perfect, they can help ensure that parents have
access to the best possible information on the fetal diagnosis. Importantly,
they are not tied to abortion regulations in any discernable way and do not
encourage any outcome.
Other state laws, however, do not mandate disclosure until the woman,
having already decided to terminate, appears at the clinic desiring an abortion—tying the provision of information to abortion access. For instance,
Wisconsin law mandates that if the unborn child has been diagnosed with a
disability, the woman must be provided printed materials with information on
“community-based services,” financial assistance programs, and support
groups for parents of children with disabilities, in addition to information on
adoption of children with special needs. 161 Unlike mandated disclosure at the
time of diagnosis, these laws make disclosure and receipt of this information
prerequisites to obtaining an abortion. The disclosure will occur when the
woman—who has already decided to terminate—visits the clinic to obtain an
abortion. 162

157 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted
in part, 2021 BL 181590 (U.S. May 17, 2021) (No. 19-1392).
158 Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110–
374, 122 Stat. 4051 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g–8).
159 Id. at § 2(1)-(3) (emphasis added).
160 See Bret D. Asbury, Fostering Informed Choice: Alleviating the Trauma of Genetic
Abortions, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 315–16 (2015).
161 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(c)(2)(e) (West 2021); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 362158(A)(2)(a)–(c) (2021).
162 See Cohen & Jofee, supra note X, at 30 (describing studies demonstrating that most
women are certain of their abortion decision by the time they arrive at an abortion or family
planning clinic).
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An increasingly popular example of tying the provision of information
to abortion access is state laws mandating disclosure to a woman about perinatal hospice and palliative care (PHPC) “as an alternative to abortion” before she can obtain an abortion. 163 PHPC is an emerging area of medical care
for women and parents who choose to continue their pregnancies after a lifelimiting fetal diagnosis. 164 The palliative care part of the model starts at the
time of the fetal diagnosis, providing families with traditional maternal-fetal
care, but also “physical, psychological, spiritual, or existential” care as culturally appropriate. 165 The hospice part of care is medical care focused on
comfort if the baby survives birth and the family chooses comfort care. 166
Currently, most women learn of the possibility of PHPC from their obstetrician or maternal fetal specialist, genetic counselor, or nurse. 167
163 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2158(A)(1)(a); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-2304 (2021);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(5)(a)–(b) (West 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(6)
(2021); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 (West 2021); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-141(2) (2021);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-746.2 (West 2021); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(c)(2). Two
state laws also mandate PHPC disclosure, but are not tied to abortion access. See IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-25-4.5-6 (requiring that provider notify patient about PHPC following fetal diagnosis); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5003 (2021) (noting discretionary disclosure after diagnosis). In
Indiana, a patient is informed of PHPC both at the time of diagnosis and at the abortion clinic.
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-25-4.5-6. For a detailed description of these statutes, see Ashley Flakus,
Choosing Wisely: Envisioning Perinatal Hospice Notification Laws that Inform and Empower,
98 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2020). Most of these statutes require disclosure of information on
PHPC in case of a “lethal fetal condition.” See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2158(A)(1)(a),
(G)(1) (mandating provision of information on PHPC when woman seeks abortion due to a
“lethal fetal condition” meaning “fetal condition that is diagnosed before birth and that will
result, with reasonable certainty, in the death of the unborn child within three months after
birth”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-2304 (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-25-4.5-2 (same). But see
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(6), (m)(2) (mandating PHPC disclosure for “medically challenging pregnancies” defined as diagnosis of “(A) a severe anomaly; or (B) an illness, disease
or defect which is invariably fatal”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-746.1 (defining “fetal
anomaly incompatible with life” as “profound and irremediable congenital or chromosomal
anomaly that is incompatible with sustaining life after birth”).We will, however, continue to
use the PHPC researcher preferred term of life-limiting fetal conditions.
164 This care is commonly referred to as “perinatal hospice.” We, however, are using an
acronym to differentiate the two types of care and help cure the “common misconception” that
perinatal hospice and palliative care are the same. Erin M. Denney-Koelsch & Denise CôtéArsenault, Introduction to Perinatal Palliative Care, in PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL GUIDE 5 (Erin M. Denney-Koelsch & Denise Côté-Arsenault eds., 2020). In fact, in the
case of stillbirth, the woman will only use the palliative care part of PHPC.
165 Id.; Charlotte Wool et al., Provision of Services in Perinatal Palliative Care: A Multicenter Survey in the United States, 19:3 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 279, 280 (2016).
166 Erin M. Denney-Koelsch & Denise Côté-Arsenault, Introduction to Perinatal Palliative Care, in PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL GUIDE 5 (Erin M. Denney-Koelsch &
Denise Côté-Arsenault eds., 2020).
167 Id. at 281 (describing that, in a survey, 97% of women were directly referred by their
obstetrician or maternal fetal medicine provider, 73% learned from genetic counselor, 60%
learned from a nurse, another 60% learned from a nurse, 60% learned from a social worker,
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Despite its growth, accessibility to PHPC is not as broad as state statutes
suggest. 168 Kansas has a PHPC notification law, 169 but has only three facilities, all of which are located around Kansas City in the eastern-most side of
the state. 170 Mississippi’s PHPC notification statute mandates that providers
inform women of the availability of PHPC, yet only one program exists in
Mississippi. 171 Cost issues may also affect access.172 Insurance companies
generally cover the costs of pregnancy and childbirth using a single global
fee, and PHPC may not be included in that global fee. 173 This includes Medicaid, which covers almost half of all pregnancies each year in the United
States. 174 Many families may be unable to pay for the additional care on their
own. 175 Researchers also note that significant barriers to PHPC care exist for
poor women and women of color. 176

61% learned from the internet, and 39% learned from “other”). Similarly, a perinatal hospice
and palliative care coordinator based in Kansas estimated that 98% of their referrals came from
obstetricians. Telephone Interview with Patti Lewis, Founder of Alexandra’s House (June 4,
2020).
168 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Perinatal Palliative Care, 134(3) OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY e84, e87 (2019) (describing that use of perinatal palliative care is
low due to the “availability of programs, patient access issues, and physician education and
training barriers”).
169 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65–6709(a)(6).
170 If You Are Pregnant Directory of Available Services, Bureau of Family Health, KAN.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T (2018), http://www.womansrighttoknow.org/download/Directory_of_Services_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYK2-DB7D]. One Kansas PHPC center is
actually located in Kansas City, Missouri. Id.
171 Perinatal Hospice & Palliative Care Programs and Support, PERINATAL HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE
CARE,
https://www.perinatalhospice.org/list-of-programs
[https://perma.cc/3S4X-LGBP].
172 Little is known about the cost of PHPC. The Perinatal Hospice and Palliative Care
website claims that PHPC is not expensive, but mentions that only one insurance plan specifically covers it. Frequently Asked Questions, PERINATAL HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE,
https://www.perinatalhospice.org/faqs [https://perma.cc/8Q7J-XUVY]. It also explains that
PHPC is no more expensive than abortion, and “[e]ven if perinatal hospice were to cost more,
many parents say the value of treating their child with dignity, and the healing peace that
comes from protecting and caring for their baby as long as he or she is able to live, cannot be
measured in dollars and cents.” Id.
173 Stefanie J. Hollenbach et al., Obstetric Mgmt. in Life-Limiting Fetal Conditions, in
PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL GUIDE, supra note 164, at 82.
174 See KATHY GIFFORD ET AL. , THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID COVERAGE
OF PREGNANCY AND PERINATAL BENEFITS: RESULTS FROM A STATE SURVEY 3, 15 (2017),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicaid-Coverage-of-Pregnancy-and-Perinatal-Benefits [https://perma.cc/N2XB-VKTW] (“Maternity care is typically reimbursed with a global
fee that covers all care for pregnant women through the postpartum period.”).
175 Hollenbach et al., supra note 173, at 82.
176 Natalia Henner et al., Considerations in Unique Populations in Perinatal Palliative
Care: From Culture, Race, Infertility, and Beyond, in PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINI-
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PHPC lacked political origins, but the antiabortion-movement has strategically adopted it as a “political tool.” 177 For example, a prominent antiabortion group, the Americans United for Life, created the Perinatal Hospice
Information Act Model Legislation & Policy Guide. 178 The guide explains
that it is imperative that parents are informed of “more compassionate” options besides abortion. 179 Again, UAL’s model legislation and all but one of
these laws currently in place mandate notification for women seeking to terminate at the abortion clinic but not at diagnosis. 180 Using abortion as a trigger for disclosure shows this is a tool for dissuasion, rather than a law seeking
to help all women who receive a life-limiting fetal diagnosis. 181
To date, there have been no challenges to the constitutionality of mandatory information about disabilities PHPC counseling. Any challenge would
not likely be successful given the Court’s history of affirming statutes purportedly aimed at ensuring informed consent, even when the law expresses
the state’s preference for childbirth over abortion. 182 In the context of PHPC,
however, the “informed consent” laws express the state’s preference for still-

GUIDE, supra note 164, at 361; see also Jill Wieber Lens, Miscarriage, Stillbirth & Reprod. Just., 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2021) (describing how the effectiveness of mental
and emotional healthcare after stillbirth differs depending on the mother’s race).
177 Danielle Paquette, Perinatal hospice care prepares parents for the end, at life’s beginning, WASH. POST (Apr. 16. 2016); Stassa Edwards, Perinatal Hospice Care Has Increasingly
Become an Alternative to Abortion, JEZEBEL (Apr. 19, 2016), https://jezebel.com/perinatalhospice-care-has-increasingly-become-an-alter-1771783259 [https://perma.cc/2HLR-JUF7].
PHPC also appears to fall on the anti-abortion side of the abortion debate because the vast
majority of women who choose to continue the pregnancy after receiving a life-threatening
fetal diagnosis are religious. Jennifer Guon et al., Our Children Are Not a Diagnosis: The
Experience of Parents Who Continue Their Pregnancy After a Prenatal Diagnosis of Trisomy
13 or 18, 164 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 308, 310–11 (2013). PHPC, however, does not include
religious care but does include spiritual care. Maurice Hopkins, Spiritual Care in the Perinatal
Period, in PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL GUIDE, supra note 164, at 234 (explaining the differences between religion and spirituality).
178 Perinatal Hospice Information Act, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, https://aul.org/what-wedo/legislation/ [https://perma.cc/YG44-NYTG].
179 Id. Arkansas’s PHPC law is identical to the model AUL legislation. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20–16–2304.
180 See supra note 168.
181 See Flakus, supra note 163, at 594 (discussing how such laws can dissuade women
from obtaining an abortion.
182 See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (discussing
that information may be required to be disclosed to the patient, so long as the information is
“truthful and not misleading”).
CAL
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birth or infant mortality over termination. Any anti-abortion success in decreasing abortion rates, however, only means an increase in stillbirth and infant mortality rates. 183
It is far from clear that disclosure laws will persuade women to continue
a pregnancy. In the context of a fetal diagnosis, most of a woman’s decisionmaking will occur in discussions with her doctors. By the time she has scheduled an appointment for an abortion, she has already made her decision and
additional counseling on disabilities or PHPC is probably not going to make
a large impact. 184 Plus, many life-threatening fetal diagnoses are made at the
threshold of viability, after which state laws often prohibits abortion. Therefore, even if she was interested in PHPC, she’d have very little (if any) time
to learn more before losing her ability to legally terminate in her state. Disclosure of information on disabilities and PHPC at the abortion clinic will
likely not change the woman’s mind, but it may very well increase her emotional distress—causing increased “guilt for going through with a decision
that now feels framed by the state as the ‘wrong’ choice to make.” 185 The
timing changes the disclosure “from an empowering piece of knowledge
helping in making a decision to a last-ditch effort to dissuade her from the
choice she has already made.” 186
III. REFUTING THE STATE’S CLAIMED NEED TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM
SECOND-TRIMESTER ABORTION
It is clear that the anti-abortion movement has targeted second-trimester
abortion as part of its stepping-stone campaign to end all abortion. State leg-

183 The availability of abortion after a lethal fetal diagnosis is inextricably linked to stillbirth and infant mortality rates. When abortion is available, stillbirths due to “congenital abnormalities account for less than 10% all stillbirths after 22 weeks of gestation, with a median
of 7.4% and a median rate of 0.4 per 1000 births . . . . Conversely with good diagnostics and
where termination of pregnancy is illegal, a higher proportion of congenital abnormalities is
reported (e.g., 21% in Ireland).” Joy E. Lawn et al., Stillbirths: Rates, Risk Factors, and Acceleration Towards 2030, 387 LANCET 587, 597 (2016); see also LINDA L. LAYNE, MOTHERHOOD LOST: A FEMINIST ACCOUNT OF PREGNANCY LOSS IN AMERICA 12 (2003) (explaining that
the “fetal death rate due to lethal abnormalities declined by almost half between the 1970’s
and 1980’s” because of abortion). Similarly, Canada’s infant mortality rates had remained
stagnant between 1991 and 1995 but then dramatically declined in 1996, with one study suggesting that the reason was increased prenatal diagnosis of abnormalities and terminations.
Shiliang Liu et al., Relationship of Prenatal Diagnosis and Pregnancy Termination to Overall
Infant Mortality in Canada, 287(12) JAMA 1561, 1563 (2002).
184 See Flakus, supra note 163, at 595 (discussing that by the time a woman goes to a clinic
to obtain an abortion, “they are certain of their decision”).
185 Id. (discussing the “serious emotional ramifications” that can occur in trying to persuade a woman to reconsider her decision to terminate a pregnancy).
186 Id.
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islatures claim numerous justifications for the second-trimester abortion restrictions discussed above. One justification common to all of them is the
woman-protective rationale—the idea that abortion hurts women, and
women thus need protection from it. 187 Professor Mary Ziegler highlighted
that the weaponization of this rationale is the strategy of “abortion’s most
sophisticated opponents.” 188 Claiming that abortion actually harms women
attempts to combat abortion rights activists’ greatest argument—that abortion
is necessary for women to achieve equality and control their destiny, the same
argument the Court relied on in Casey. 189
The woman-protective rationale first surfaced in Casey to affirm an informed consent provision that was purportedly necessary to prevent the psychological consequences of a not-fully-informed decision to abort. 190 Building on Casey, the rationale took center stage four years later in Carhart, when
the Court highlighted the need to prevent women from experiencing psychological distress when they later learn of the specifics of the Dilation & Extraction (D&X) procedure—a distress unsupported by actual evidence. 191
Since Carhart, states have attempted to rely on the woman-protective rationale to justify numerous abortion restrictions, including requiring abortion
providers to have hospital admitting privileges nearby as a quality metric,
although with mixed results. 192 This strategy is continuing today in Dobbs,
187 Most of these laws are also justified on the grounds that they are necessary to protect
the fetus from either a “gruesome” death or from discrimination. These justifications are outside the scope of our paper.
188 Mary Ziegler, The Heartbeat Bills Were Never the Real Threat to Abortion, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/opinion/abortion-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/8P3H-PYPE].
189 ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
145.
190 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (explaining that an
informed consent provision helps “reduc[e] the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only
to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed”).
191 See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 837 (2007) (describing
Carhart as “the first time [the Court adopted] a woman-protective justification for restricting
access to abortion”).
192 The woman-protective rationale was successful at convincing many lower courts that
targeted restrictions on abortion provider (TRAP) laws—like the requirement that physicians
have hospital admitting privileges—were constitutional. This line of reasoning was ultimately
unsuccessful at convincing the Supreme Court in 2016, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). In 2020, in June Med. Servs. L.L C. v. Russo, however, a
majority of the Supreme Court stated that they would have held differently had the issue been
one of first impression, and Justice Roberts only concurred to uphold Whole Woman’s Health
based on precedent. 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133–2142 (2020) (Roberts, J., concurring). Since then,
the Court has only become more conservative with Justice Barrett and certainly, if Whole
Woman’s Health were heard today, the Court would have decided differently.
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where Mississippi justifies its fifteen week ban by arguing, in part, that abortions have substantial health and emotional risks associated with them, which
only increase as the pregnancy progresses. 193 These risks, according to the
state include “depression; anxiety; substance abuse; and other emotional or
phycological problems.” 194
Notably, the woman-protective rationale entered the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence long before Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 195 a case
that Justice Roberts believes altered the Casey undue burden test by requiring
the state to prove that the benefits of an abortion regulation outweigh its
costs. 196 Under the balancing test from Whole Woman’s Health, if a state
abortion law had no benefits, then it would create an undue burden because
the burdens would almost always outweigh the nonexistent benefits. In his
concurrence in June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Russo, Justice Roberts explained that Casey does not require a balancing of the benefits and burdens
of an abortion restriction, but only an analysis of the burdens. 197 At least theoretically, under the Chief Justice’s view, an abortion law does not need to
benefit women to be constitutional so long as it is not unduly burdensome.
But despite the Chief Justice’s restatement, it is clear that the Court relied on
an abortion law’s benefits in Carhart (long before Whole Woman’s Health).
Even if the Chief Justice doesn’t think a law’s benefits must outweigh its
burdens, the woman-protective rationale can be used to justify the state’s interest in the law, and to otherwise serve a legitimizing function. The rationale
provides cover against the critique that the Court is prioritizing the fetus over
the woman or ignoring women’s interests entirely. The rationale enables the
Court to claim, even if just in dicta, that the restriction benefits both the
woman and the fetus. One scholar has posited that the rationale might even
be raised more often and with less support if the law’s benefits are less integral to the analysis and thus scrutinized less. 198 And of course, the rationale—
to the extent it is persuasive—also affects public opinion.
193

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,
945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-1392).
194 Id.
195 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
196 June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2136 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts voted
with the majority, holding that Louisiana’s law in June Medical was unconstitutional, but he
made clear that he would sympathetically review novel abortion restrictions. Id. at 2133.
197 Id. The Fifth Circuit claimed to be following Justice Roberts’s June Medical opinion
in upholding Texas’s D&E ban and the Fifth Circuit still discussed the woman protective rationale in evaluating the state’s interest. 10-11, 15.
198 See Reva B. Siegal, Why Restrict Abortion? Expanding the Frame on June Medical,
2020 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46 (forthcoming 2021) (“we can see that conservative judges attacking
balancing [from Whole Woman’s Health] are embracing standards that will legitimate the
woman-protective health justifications of TRAP laws and weaken the restrictions that Casey
imposes on them.”)
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This Part builds on existing legal scholarship that criticizes the paternalism and gender stereotypes underpinning the woman-protective rationale
generally, 199 focusing on the special arguments made in the second trimester.
Section A exposes the paternalism and gender stereotypes behind D&X and
Dilation and Evacuation (D&E) bans, and Section B focuses on restrictions
regarding abortions due to fetal anomalies. 200 Both Sections also present empirical evidence demonstrating that the laws will only harm women’s
health. 201
A. Protection from “Gruesomeness”
In Carhart, the Court relied heavily on the woman-protective rationale
in holding Congress’s ban on the D&X second-trimester abortion procedure
constitutional. First, without citing any evidence, Justice Kennedy concluded
that some women eventually regret their decision to abort. 202 Then, he noted
that the regret would be even stronger for women who later learn the specifics
of the D&X procedure she received:
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.
Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow. In a decision so
fraught with emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not
to disclose precise details of the means that will be used, confining
themselves to the required statement of risks the procedure entails
. . . . It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more
profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did
199 See e.g., Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 224 (2009) (describing that the current state
of the law does not take into consideration that women are fully capable enough to make the
decision to have an abortion); see also EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 87, at 198–99 (discussing
Justice Kennedy’s remarks in Carhart); Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double
Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1615 (2008) (noting
that the Court in Carhart “portrays women as unusually fragile and unable to make informed
choices about” obtaining an abortion); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional
Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641,
1688 (2008) (discussing how anti-abortion activists portray women as “too weak or confused”
to make the decision to have an abortion and that law’s need to protect them); Reva B. Siegel,
The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 (2007) (explaining that the anti-abortion movement now
seeks to “protect[] women’s health and choices as mothers”).
200 See infra notes 202–230 and accompanying text.
201 See infra notes 232–270 and accompanying text.
202 Gonzales v. Carhart, 500 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007).
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not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum
the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the
human form. 203
Thus, the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s psychological well-being
served as a basis for constitutionally depriving her of a safe and available
second-trimester medical procedure.
Carhart created the blueprint for the recent en banc Fifth Circuit decision finding Texas’s D&E ban constitutional. 204 The Fifth Circuit quoted this
exact language from Carhart about a woman’s later realization and explained
the same was true with Texas’s law—women were not being told that “the
fetus’s body parts—arms, legs, ribs, skull, and everything—will be ripped
apart and pulled out piece by piece.” 205 The Fifth Circuit also more generally
invoked the woman-protective rationale, recounting the State’s evidence that
“women seeking abortions benefit physically and psychologically when fetal
death occurs before dismemberment” as fetal demise “can help with emotional difficulties for the patient.” 206 Thus, depriving women of the option of
a D&E without fetal demise beforehand is actually in their best interest.
Other states have also argued this same analogy between Congress’s
D&X ban and their own D&E bans. Arkansas first described the “chillingly
barbaric” nature of the procedure, 207 and argued that a woman would feel
psychological distress when she later learned the specifics. 208 These statements are supported by women claiming as amici that they would not have
consented to the abortion if they had known the details. Just as Texas did,
Arkansas also argued that fetal demise beforehand psychologically benefits
“an overwhelming majority of patients” because it may alleviate the difficult
emotions the procedure can evoke. 209 Indiana similarly argued that its D&E
ban “protects women’s mental health by ensuring that women seeking abortion do not have a D&E only later to discover the brutal and inhumane way
in which the fetus was killed.” 210 Indiana also added that the protection was
203 Id. (internal citations omitted). Justice Kennedy overlooks the real reason that doctors
may not disclose the specifics of an abortion procedure, mainly because informed consent law
does not require it. See infra notes 333–335 and accompanying text (explaining that a provider
is not required to explain the details of an abortion procedure to a woman).
204 Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 2021 WL 3661318 (5th Cir. 2021).
205 Id. at *8.
206 Id. at *7.
207 Brief of Appellants at 31–32, Hopkins v. Jegley, No.17–2879, (8th Cir. Dec. 1, 2017).
208 See id. at 6 (noting that one woman lamented that none of her medical providers
explained the procedure—“that the limbs of my baby would be ripped apart and torn out” or
“the emotional and psychological” cost of enduring the procedure).
209 Brief of Appellants, Jegley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 34.
210 See Def.’s Mem. In Opp. To Plf.’s Mot. For Prelim. Inj., Bernard v. Individual Members of Ind. Med. Licensing Bd. at 14, No. 1:19–cv–1660–SEB–DML (S.D. Ind. May 17,
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especially necessary because women seeking second-trimester abortion are
especially susceptible to experiencing a “wide range of adverse psychological reactions” after an abortion. 211
These arguments are laden with gender stereotypes—that women should
be horrified of the D&X and D&E procedures. 212 And thus, any woman who
did consent to these procedures—as Reva Siegal explained in other abortion
contexts—must have been “mistaken or misled or coerced or pressured into
decisions they do not want to make and should not make because abortion
violates women’s nature as mothers.” 213 Further, the state reinforces yet another prominent gender stereotype of the emotional pregnant woman, incompetent to make medical decisions, when it suggests that women are best protected by banning the procedure, instead of informing them about what the
procedure entails beforehand. Justice Ginsburg and legal scholars have noted
this paternalism in the D&X context. 214 For instance, a legal scholar has explained that outside of the abortion context, the law does not interfere with
non-pregnant, mentally competent adults making critical decisions related to
their healthcare that they may regret afterwards. Yet when it comes to a pregnant woman making the decision to obtain an abortion, the law suggests that
“someone other than the patient knows better what life choices will lead to
2019) (arguing that the ban “protects women’s mental health by ensuring that women seeking
abortion do not have a D&E only later to discover the brutal and inhumane way in which the
fetus was killed”); see also Resp. in Opp. to Plf.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. or TRO., Little Rock
Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge at 46, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (E.D. Ark. 2019) No. 4:19–
cv–00449–KGB, 2019 WL 7563579 (arguing that D&E abortions lead “real Arkansas women
suffer profound grief and sorrow caused by their decision to have a dismemberment abortion
of a quickened, unborn child”); Def. Brinkman’s Resp. in Opp. to Mot. for TRO and/or Prelim.
Inj. at 12, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, No. 3:18–cv–00224–JHM–DW
(W.D. Ky. May 8, 2018) (“Indeed, any abortion has the potential to result in grief or anguish
for the mother who has chosen to abort her child.”).
211 Def.’s Mem. In Opp. To Plf.’s Motion For Prelim. Inj., supra note 210, at 14.
212 See Maroney, supra note X, at 900.
213 Siegel, The New Politics Of Abortion, supra note 199, at 1013; see also Siegel, Dignity
and the Politics of Protection, supra note 199, at 1792 (“The new gender paternalism is in fact
the old gender paternalism: laws . . . for the claimed purpose of protecting women from coercion and/or freeing them to be mothers.”).
214 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 500 U.S. 124, 184 (2007) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“The
solution the Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and
adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks . . . . Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their
safety.”); see also EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 87, at 198 (“In a textbook example of paternalism, [the Court] wanted to protect her, even if her own values and assessment of the situation
differed from theirs.”); CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION 132 (2017) (“The Court decided it
was better for everyone to ban the whole thing rather than to force a confrontation through
disclosure ahead of time.”); Dresser, supra note 199, at 1615 (“Abortion disclosure laws separate women deciding about abortion from people deciding about other kinds of medical interventions.”).
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mentally healthy consequences,” and therefore she must be protected from
herself. 215
Actual evidence, however, shows the opposite—that D&Xs and D&Es
can be psychologically beneficial for women. 216 This is especially true when
a D&X is requested in the context of fetal anomaly. As one scholar has noted,
Justice Kennedy ignored evidence that some women preferred the D&X to
avoid regret by saying goodbye to a wanted pregnancy: “This is precisely
because the intact process produces what Justice Kennedy found an unthinkable preference: an entire fetal body . . . .” 217 For these women, they found it
vitally important to be able to “see[], hold[], and bid[] goodbye to their baby”
after the abortion. 218
[A]fter the [D&X], if the family desires, the hospital staff will prepare the baby to look as “untraumatized” as possible. They have
little gowns that they dress the fetus in. They wrap it very gently in
a blanket. They sometimes have a little bonnet that they put over
the head. . . . And then they present this to the patient and generally
her husband as well. And the patients are sometimes satisfied with
that, and sometimes they completely undress the fetus, and look at
it, and touch it, and cry, and say goodbye.” 219
This described practice is called “memory-making.” Giving women this
option is part of the standard of care after stillbirth, and also common in perinatal hospice and palliative care (PHPC). 220 Extensive and almost undisputed empirical evidence of women after stillbirth shows that this time with
the baby psychologically benefits the mother. 221 There is no reason to think
the same benefits wouldn’t inure in the abortion context when a woman
chooses memory-making. The D&X gave women the ability to hold their
child intact without requiring them to give birth with an induction abortion. 222
Thus, the D&X was a cheaper, less risky, and less invasive procedure that

215

Manian, supra note 199, at 259.
See Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56,
at 225–31 (discussing D&X and D&E procedures and their mental and emotional effects on
women).
217 SANGER, supra note 214, at 151.
218 Id.
219 Joint Appendix at 43-44, Gonzales v. Carhart, 500 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05–380), 2006
WL 1440830.
220 See infra notes 362–364 and accompanying text (discussing providers offering the option of memory-making).
221 See infra notes 362-364 and accompanying text (discussing the potential benefits of
memory-making).
222 COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 209–11.
216
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still allowed this type of memory-making. 223 Admittedly, far from all women
who have D&Xs would desire memory-making, but as explored below, some
find it beneficial and have fewer negative emotions if allowed to receive it.
Even though these bans theoretically allow D&E and D&X procedures
to continue if fetal demise is initiated beforehand, studies show that fetal demise before a D&E can actually increase psychological difficulty for some
women. 224 Though some women reported feeling that their abortion was
more acceptable with fetal demise, others specifically expressed emotional
difficulty when fetal demise was induced a day or more in advance of the
procedure, as is common, because they were troubled by the idea of carrying
a dead fetus. For the women who had started to feel fetal movement, the immediate cessation of movement could be jarring. Notably, some of the women
who were ultimately reassured by the fetal demise were still troubled with
the decreased fetal movement and carrying of a dead fetus. Women experiencing pregnancy loss echo these sentiments, describing having lost their
agency in becoming “the passive vessel of a corpse. One woman described
feeling like a ‘human coffin,’ another like ‘a living tomb.’” 225 Thus, there is
not one-size-fits-all approach that justifies requiring all women who need
second-trimester abortions to first instigate fetal demise. It is a helpful resource for many women, but a distressing one for others, and women should
be able to choose if it would be beneficial to them.
Similarly, the possibility of induction abortion— as an alternative to fetal demise, still permissible under the statute—would also not protect
women’s interests. Studies demonstrate that women prefer D&Es and D&Xs
over induction abortion because induction abortion is almost identical to
childbirth. 226 In a European study, some women who had induction abortions
resented health professionals treating them in the same way that women in
childbirth are treated and reported that delivering the fetus was traumatic and
painful. One woman was especially distressed at the idea of the abortion occurring while lying back in a bed, just like childbirth. The authors explained
that the similarities to childbirth detracted from the idea of second-trimester
abortion as a necessary healthcare procedure. 227 The women who had a D&E
223 Though some memory making is available with a D&E, only the D&X allows women
to hold an intact baby.
224 See generally McNamara et al., supra note 120, 516–18 (describing the “varied understanding” of fetal demise among women and evaluating women’s experience with this procedure).
225 LAYNE, MOTHERHOOD LOST, supra note X, at 86.
226 See generally Purcell et. al., supra note 38, at 174–76 (recounting women’s experiences
of second-trimester abortion by labor induction and its parallels to childbirth). The study describes that one group of women had an abortion by labor induction, which was called a “medication” abortion. Id. at 165. The other group had a D&E with fetal demise beforehand. Id.
227 Id. at 180.
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told very different stories, with much less emphasis on the specifics of the
procedure itself. 228
The similarities between induction abortions and childbirth are likely
not lost on the anti-abortion movement. An induction equates abortion to
childbirth—a defining experience of motherhood for many women. 229 Requiring birth would condition abortion on a woman’s willingness to confront
her fetus and agree to deliver a child to force its death. The point is to make
abortion distressing and painful, to shame them into continuing the pregnancy, to force them to choose between giving birth to a live child or a dead
one. “Legislators have decided that some experience of one’s infant, if only
childbirth itself, is necessary to grasp the profound nature of what is at stake
in the decision to separate from one’s baby.” 230 Requiring fetal demise before
a surgical abortion or requiring abortion via labor induction creates a medical
experience similar to a woman whose pregnancy ends naturally before birth,
in either late miscarriage or early stillbirth. Perhaps state legislators are hoping these similarities will “correct” women to act more like mothers. 231
B. Good Mothers and Children with Disabilities
The woman-protective rationale is also front and center in state defenses
of disability-selective abortion bans and PHPC counseling laws. First, with
respect to disability-selective abortion bans, states claim that a ban is needed
to protect women who “feel ‘bullied’ into aborting their unborn child” 232 because doctors allegedly pressure or mislead women into abortions after prenatal diagnosis. 233 States claim that physicians “provide biased information”

228

Id. at 176 (“The accounts of women who had undergone surgical procedures thus appeared to be more distanced from the corporeality of the procedure….”).
229 SEE SANGER, supra note 214, at 122 (describing state attempts to force women to feel
like mothers before abortion).
230 Id. Another way legislators can force women to confront their fetus is through mandatory ultrasound laws. See Note, J. Aidan Lang, The Right to Remain Silent: Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 62 B.C. L. REV. 2091, 2091–95 (2021) (discussing state laws that
require informed consent and ultrasound prior to an abortion—including a mandate that physicians point out the fetus’s features to a patient as they conduct an ultrasound, which can be
distressing for a woman who has chosen to terminate a pregnancy due to fetal abnormalities).
231 Women who experience pregnancy loss are often pegged against those experiencing
abortion, but the reality is that these two groups have a lot in common. We explore this issue
in depth in a forthcoming paper.
232 Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v.
Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health at 15, No. 1:16–CV–763–TWP–DML (S.D. Ind. Oct. 26,
2016).
233 Def Rsp. to Plf.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C.
v. Beshear at 17, No. 3:19–cv–00178-DJH (W.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2019).
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and commit “overt or subtle bias or coercion.” 234 Not only do women (supposedly) need protection from bullying doctors, they also need it from themselves—their decision to abort, according to the state, will deny them the joy
and psychological benefit of raising a child with special needs. 235 Essentially,
the state thinks that parents will make decisions based on ableist stereotypes
and should be prevented from doing so.
Sixth Circuit judges recently relied on both of these paternalistic ideas
in upholding Ohio’s ban on abortions based on a fetal Down Syndrome diagnosis. 236 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit, in Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud,
explained the asserted state interest to protect “families from coercive
healthcare practices” demonstrated by uncited “[e]mpirical reports” from
parents that “doctors explicitly encouraged abortion or emphasized the challenges or raising children with Down syndrome.” 237 Judge Bush’s concurring
opinion also suggested that this law will be good for parents and families
because their child will make them happy: “79% of parents of children with
Down Syndrome felt that ‘their outlook on life was more positive because of
their child’ and 88% of people whose siblings have Down Syndrome felt that
they were better people for their sibling’s presence in their life.” 238

234 Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes at 18, 20, No. 18–3329
(6th Cir. June 22, 2018); see also Resp. in Opp. To Plf.’s Mot. for TRO/Prelim. Inj., Memphis
Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slatery at 16, No. 3:20-cv-00501 (M.D. Tenn. July 6, 2020) (arguing
that “medical professionals often pressure expectant mothers who receive a Down syndrome
diagnosis to have an abortion and fail to provide them with accurate information about the
child’s prognosis.”).
235 Def. Rsp. to Plf.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, supra note 233, at 23; see also Brief
of Appellants, Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region et al., v.
Parson et al. at 19–21, Nos. 19–2882, 19–3134 (8th Cir. Nov. 14, 2019) (explaining that parents are happy with their decision to have their child with Down Syndrome and that the child
brings joy to their families).
236 See Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512, 581–82 (6th Cir. 2021) (discussing
the need for women to be protected from “coercive abortions”). Notably, The Sixth Circuit
interpreted the ban as not a total ban because a pregnant patient could still receive an abortion
if they did not reveal the basis. Id. at 522.
237 Id. at 518. Logically, one would presume that this alleged pressure is exerted before a
woman makes her decision, that is before she enters the abortion clinic. The state law, however, would affect only the doctor performing the abortion at the clinic.
238 Id. at 549–50 (Bush, J., concurring). He also echoed and cited to Seventh Circuit Judge
Marion’s partial concurring opinion, which concluded that Indiana’s Down Syndrome ban was
constitutional because parents of children with Down Syndrome “are quite happy and lead
fulfilling lives” and because children with Down syndrome are a joy to be around. Planned
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300, 316
(7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 727 F. App’x 208 (7th Cir. 2018),
vacated, 917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2018), and opinion reinstated, 917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2018),
and cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d in part sub nom. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind.
& Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019).
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States also use the woman-protective rationale to justify restrictions on
abortion in the case of life-threatening or fatal conditions. States claim, “the
grieving process is actually better for the woman by actually going ahead and
giving birth,” 239 and that women will experience “more despair and depression” if they terminate than if the child is stillborn or dies in hospice. 240 PHPC
laws similarly note the purported psychological benefit of continuing a pregnancy after a fatal prenatal diagnosis. Arkansas’s “Women’s Right to Know”
PHPC law expressly states that termination can cause women to experience
more serious long-term mental health issues, whereas continuing the pregnancy with PHPC allows families to be “emotionally and spiritually prepared
for the death of their child.” 241 A required brochure produced by the Indiana
Department of Health 242 provides similar advice and also suggests that abortion can delay and complicate the healing process. 243 Whereas, “mothers who
chose to carry their baby to term recover to baseline mental health more
quickly than those who aborted due to fetal anomaly” accentuating that PHPC
is psychologically safe for women. 244
The idea that women are bullied into terminating after a prenatal diagnosis relies on the sexist stereotype of the incompetent or vulnerable pregnant
woman overly susceptible to suggestion or persuasion, as does the state’s solution to ban these abortions. 245 First and foremost, it is important to note that
studies contradict states’ claims that women are pressured into abortion after

239

Eric Adler, “I Would Have Delivered a Dead Baby.” Missouri Law Denies Abortion
for Fatal Disorders, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article231942993.html [https://perma.cc/28FF-9DTF].
240 Arya Sundaram, Texas Senate Removes Exception That Allows Abortion After 20
weeks if the Pregnancy is Unviable, TEX. TRIBUNE (May 7, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/07/texas-abortion-law-allowing-procedures-after-20-weeks-removed-senate/ [https://perma.cc/GY69-MADE].
241 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-2302(a)(4)–(5) (2021).
242 Perinatal Hospice, IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.in.gov/isdh/files/Perinatal%20Hospice%20Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZH2-M5BG]. The brochure also
warns of physical risks of terminating and claims childbirth has no increased risk. Id. But
increased physical risks do exist in stillbirth. See Jill Wieber Lens, Medical Paternalism, Stillbirth, & Blindsided Mothers, 106 IOWA L. REV. 666, 670–72 (2020) (discussing research
showing that women face more life-threatening complications in stillbirth than in live childbirth); see also Elizabeth Wall-Wieler et al., Severe Maternal Morbidity Among Stillbirth and
Live Birth Deliveries in California, 134(2) OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 310, 312 (2019) (explaining that the chances of life-threatening complications for the woman are nearly five times
greater in a stillbirth than a live birth).
243 Perinatal Hospice, supra note 242.
244 Id.
245 Siegal, Why Restrict Abortion?, supra note X, at 20 (“In addition to arguing that access
to abortion threatened women’s health, Reardon also argued that access to abortion threatened
women’s freedom. Women were coerced into abortions that traumatized them.”).
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a prenatal diagnosis. 246 And this makes sense—what would motivate a
woman’s doctor to encourage abortion? What stake would they have in that
outcome? But even if it were true, the obvious solution would be to mandate
neutral counseling that occurs at the time of diagnosis, not at the time of abortion. In fact, the federal Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions
Awareness Act already attempts to provide additional resources to parents
facing a prenatal diagnosis that are neutral and unbiased. 247 Instead, the state
argues that women must be deprived of abortion as an option, suggesting that
pregnant women cannot be trusted to make the right choice for themselves
and their families even with accurate and unbiased information.
Similarly, the need to protect women from abortion after a prenatal diagnosis is also based on stereotypical, gendered notions of motherhood. The
notion that motherhood is a gift regardless of a child’s disability relies solely
on traditional gender stereotypes about “good” mothers, playing on the shame
some women may already feel by considering abortion. 248 According to the
archetype, a good mother would never choose to end her child’s life. She
would embrace any disabilities affecting her fetus and selflessly give herself
over as a caretaker regardless of the sacrifices that are entailed. 249 If her fetus
suffered a life-threatening diagnosis, a good mother would want to savor the
limited time she had left with her baby before he or she died—she would seek
PHPC to ease her fears and experience the “life and death” of her child in a
secure, supportive setting with her family. 250 These stereotypes, however, are
not based on a woman’s actual experiences. Women who terminate after
learning of a fetal anomaly often report doing so out of the love they have for
their child and not wanting to watch their child suffer in this world.251 Many
246 See e.g., Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Maternal Decision to Terminate Pregnancy After
Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, 19 AM. J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 149.e1, 149.e4 (2007)
(explaining that only one woman in the entire study reported feeling pressure from her health
care provider to terminate her pregnancy).
247 Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110–
374, 122 Stat. 4051 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g–8).
248 See Nao Araki, The Experiences of Pregnant Women Diagnosed with a Fetal Abnormality, 24:2 J. JAPAN ACAD. MIDWIFERY 358, 361 (2010) (discussing the pressure a mother
can feel in trying to be a “good mother”).
249 See id. (discussing the isolation and uncertainty that women may experience in taking
care of their child). Anti-abortion activists similarly attempted to shame women terminating
due to fetal anomaly within the debate over D&X abortions before Carhart, describing even
fatal anomalies “as inconveniences which callous parents used to justify abortion, but that
loving parents should confront and overcome.” Oliveri, supra note 84, at 409–10.
250 See MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-141(2) (explaining why some women would choose
PHPC).
251 See Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56,
at 208–09, 226–28 (recounting a woman’s story of choosing to obtain an abortion and discussing the motivation behind decisions to terminate in the case of severe fetal anomaly).
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women also terminate because they think it is in the best interest of their living children, who they also feel bound to protect. 252
We do not challenge the fact that many parents who have children with
disabilities love them unconditionally and are eternally grateful for their existence. But this is a self-selecting group of parents who had the option of
terminating and chose to continue the pregnancy. It is inappropriate to extrapolate this positive experience onto parents who would have otherwise terminated. We also note that it is not surprising that women express joy in having a child. There is enormous pressure to publicly express gratitude for a
child, even when one’s feelings are more conflicted: the duty to embrace
motherhood means that “regret over motherhood becomes inappropriate once
a child is born.” 253 These social pressures are so strong that it is difficult to
evaluate the reliability of any study regarding the decision to have the
child. 254 That is not to say that it is better for women to terminate in the face
of a prenatal diagnosis—it’s not. For any given family, the “best” decision
will be different.
Further, studies show that women who choose to terminate a pregnancy
after a prenatal diagnosis do not regret their decision, nor do women who
continue the pregnancy. 255 Relatedly, for decades, tort law has recognized the
reasonableness of a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy due to a fetal
diagnosis. 256 Specifically, a wrongful birth claim allows a woman to sue for
252

Jamie R. Abrams, The Polarization of Reproductive and Parental Decision-Making,
44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1281, 1309–10 (2017).
253 Katrien Schaubroeck & Kristien Hens, Parental Choices and the Prospect of Regret:
An Alternative Account, 25(5) INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 586, 590 (2017).
254 Id. at 589.
255 See e.g., Korenromp et al., supra note 246, at 149.e3 (explaining that only 6% of
women in a survey expressed regret over terminating, 75% of whom felt regret “occasionally”
and 25% of whom felt regret “strongly”); Stina Lou et al., Termination of Pregnancy Following a Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: A Qualitative Study of the Decision-Making
Process of Pregnant Couples, 97 ACTA OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY SCANDANAVIA 1228, 1234
(2018) (discussing that couples did not regret their decision to terminate a pregnancy).
256 See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 265, 276 (2003) (“The single largest number of wrongful birth cases have been
brought for failure to provide information about the risk of Down syndrome to women of
‘advanced maternal age.’”); see e.g., Wilkie v. Aslam, No. BPG–08–1425, 2009 WL 3487903,
at *1 (D. Md. 2009) (discussing the issue of whether a physician was negligent in not informing a parent of the increased risk that her child would be born with Down Syndrome and
whether the diagnosis was the proximate cause of needing to provide post-majority care);
Fruiterman v. Granata, 668 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Va. 2008) (reversing a wrongful birth suit for
lack of demonstrating proximate causation); see also Daniel W. Whitney & Kenneth N. Rosenbaum, Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Birth, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 167, 170–71 (explaining
that wrongful birth cases are brought when children have severe birth defects versus “minor
genetic defect[s]” and classifying down syndrome as a severe birth defect). That a wrongful
birth claim has existed for decades, however, does not mean it is uncontroversial. See generally
Lydia X. Z. Brown Legal Ableism, Interrupted: Developing Tort Law & Policy Alternatives
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damages based on the lost ability to terminate her pregnancy due to medical
malpractice in failing to diagnose or disclose birth defects. Courts have specifically rejected the idea of reducing a mother’s damages for wrongful birth
because of the joy she also may experience in raising her child—her joy does
not justify depriving her of the ability to make an informed decision whether
to terminate. 257 These studies and this history show that a woman is not better
off psychologically or otherwise if forced to continue a pregnancy after a
prenatal diagnosis. It is an immensely personal choice, and women are generally content with their choice either way.
Similarly, little to no evidence actually supports the state’s argument that
women are better off continuing a pregnancy even when the fetus is not expected to survive. In fact, actual PHPC research contradicts state’s claims that
PHPC is psychologically superior for women than terminating. 258 To the contrary, these researchers expressly conclude that women who choose to terminate and who choose to continue their pregnancy express a “similar rate of
regret.” 259 A literature review in 2011 similarly concluded that women who
choose to terminate later in the pregnancy due to fetal anomaly experience
“no worse” mental health effects than women who continue their pregnancy
and give birth to a baby with fatal or serious health conditions, or endure
stillbirth or later miscarriage. 260 These researchers understand the reality that
most women will suffer psychological distress regardless of their choice due
to the inevitability of their child’s death.
Admittedly, at least one study exists concluding that women who chose
to continue their pregnancy reported less despair and depression than women

to Wrongful Birth & Wrongful Life Claims, 38(2) DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2018) (providing an
overview of the history of wrongful birth claims).
257 Lodato ex rel. Lodato v. Kappy, 803 A.2d 160, 165–66 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2002).
258 Denney-Koelsch & Côté-Arsenault, supra note 164, at 8.
259 Id. (emphasis added); see also Marijke J. Korenromp et. al., Adjustment to Termination
of Pregnancy for Fetal Anomaly: A Longitudinal Study in Women at 4, 8, and 16 Months, 201
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 160.e1, 160.e4 (2009) (discussing that “[i]n spite of the
large and long-lasting psychological consequences of [termination] for fetal anomaly, < 3%
of women at each occasion mentioned feelings of strong regret, “[t]here was clear improvement over time for all the women for all outcome measures” and “the majority of women
adapted well to their loss.”).
260 Julia A. Steinberg, Later Abortions and Mental Health: Psychological Experiences of
Women Having Later Abortions—A Critical Review of Research, 21:3S WOMEN’S HEALTH
ISSUES S44, S47 (2011). The study also pointed out that “factors associated with having later
abortions may also put women at risk of psychological problems after later abortions” instead
of the later abortion itself. They include the “reasons for the delay” in obtaining an abortion,
“level of wantedness of the pregnancy, experiences of adverse life circumstances, mental
health, demographic and economic factors, type of procedure, experiences of fetal movement,
and stigma.” Id. at S45.
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who chose to terminate their pregnancies after a lethal fatal diagnosis of anencephaly. 261 Numerous problems exist with the study, including its failure
to account for the woman’s mental health prior to the fetal diagnosis. 262 It
also suggests that society more readily acknowledges and accepts stillbirth
and infant death, 263 which runs contrary to other substantial research describing the isolation women feel after stillbirth and infant death.264 The study also
inaccurately implies that memory-making is available only after pregnancy
continuation and not after abortion. 265 But perhaps the largest problem with
the use of this study to regulate abortion is the fact that the study’s findings
depend on the woman’s choice—that these women were offered and declined
termination. One cannot extrapolate from them that women who are forced
to continue pregnancies would fare as well psychologically as women who
actively chose to continue the pregnancy. In fact, one could assume that given
the traumatic nature of the circumstance, removing a woman’s limited autonomy would only deepen her agony.
We want to conclude with a note about truly supported decision-making.
It is certainly true that many parents are overwhelmed and scared when first
learning of a prenatal diagnosis; they may not know what to expect in raising
a child with special needs and may even default to ableist assumptions. That
is why it is so important that they receive neutral and accurate information
on the particular fetal anomaly at the time of diagnosis. In an ideal world,
expectant parents would be connected to—and have time to connect with—
parents who made either choice, to understand the reality of both experiences.

261 See Heidi Cope et al., Pregnancy Continuation and Organization Religious Activity
Following Prenatal Diagnosis of a Lethal Fetal Defect are Associated with Improved Psychological Outcome, 35(8) PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 761 ( 2015) (explaining that “[p]regnancy continuation was [] associated with less psychiatric distress, . . . less despair, avoidance and depression,” and that women who terminated were more likely to feel guilt).
262 See Steinberg, supra note 260, at S45 (explaining that it is “important to consider how
prior mental health [is] controlled for in analyses, because it is a strong predictive factor of
mental health postpregnancy”).
263 Cope et al., supra note 261, at 767.
264 See Maureen C. Kelley & Susan B. Trinidad, Silent Loss and the Clinical Encounter:
Parents’ and Physicians’ Experiences of Stillbirth—A Qualitative Analysis, 12 BMC PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH 1, 13 (describing that parents feel isolated due to “the awkwardness and
discomfort felt by others when parents of a stillborn try to discuss their experience, or when
they try to normalize it by mentioning their stillborn child alongside their live children as part
of their family”); see also Samantha Murphy & Joanne Cacciatore, The Psychological, Social,
and Economic Impact of Stillbirth on Families, 22 SEMINARS IN FETAL & NEONATAL MED.
129, 131 (2017) (“[S]tillbirth is a loss often unacknowledged and invalidated by society.”).
265 See Cope et al., supra note 261, at 767 (“Continuing the pregnancy also allows more
opportunities to find meaning and for memory making, such as opportunities to hold and care
for the baby, take photographs, create other keepsakes and perhaps participate in research,
tissue or organ donation, all of which can contribute positively to the grieving process.”).
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Similarly, in case of a life-limiting fetal condition, the obstetrician or maternal fetal specialist should continue to provide information on, and referral to
PHPC at the time of the prenatal diagnosis, long before the woman enters the
abortion clinic. 266 Women should have access to this care regardless of their
geography or economic means. For a woman to make a “fully informed decision” about whether to terminate or continue a pregnancy, she needs the
most complete an accurate picture that can be provided at the relevant time. 267
Abortion laws only convolute this process—they force women to make
rushed decisions and heavily burden one choice over the other. They do not
protect women; they coerce and shame them.
***
Part III demonstrates how the woman-protective rationales underlying
these second-trimester abortion restrictions are paternalistic, dependent on
gender stereotypes, and factually dubious or incorrect. Unfortunately, this defensive approach has not been sufficient to persuade courts to reject the
woman-protective rationale underlying these second-trimester abortion restrictions. In Carhart, for instance, the Court’s analysis was based not on science, but the Justices’ intuition. 268 The Court even ignored some of the countervailing evidence presented above that the D&X helped some women avoid
regret by saying goodbye. “[T]he great error of the Carhart majority’s invocation of emotional common sense” was to “privilege the individual Justices’
own emotional . . . reaction to the intact D&E method,” “ignore[] other permissible meaning structures” and “force[] a false consensus.” 269 Instead, the
Carhart opinion actually permits the state to reach its own scientific conclusions, even if they are contradicted by the medical establishment. 270
As a result, Part IV recommends a new approach to dismantling the
woman-protective rationale underlying second-trimester abortion restrictions. It suggests that the abortion rights movement can fight back against

266

See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing when women are informed
about PHPC).
267 See ACOG Committee Opinion No. 786, Perinatal Palliative Care, 134 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY e84, e88 (2019) (explaining that “tenets of informed consent require that patients be presented with this full array of reasonable and ethically acceptable options” after a
lethal fetal diagnosis, including abortion and perinatal palliative care).
268 See Maroney, supra note X, at 901 (describing that Justice Kennedy thought the D&X
procedure “morally (not just physically) disgusting”); see also Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 419–20 (describing Justice Kennedy’s focus on disgust in Carhart).
269 Maroney, supra note X, at 901.
270 The Court gave “legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
medical and scientific uncertainty.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 500 U.S. 124, 163 (2007).
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many of the woman-protective claims with radical transparency about second-trimester abortion—transparency that will also improve patient care. Not
only does this approach help combat the woman-protective rationale in litigation, but it might also help the abortion rights movement better frame public discussions regarding second-trimester abortion. If the Supreme Court
rules in Dobbs that pre-viability abortion bans can be constitutional, the abortion rights movement will need new strategies to defend abortion rights
across the country.
IV. EMBRACING ABORTION “DANGERTALK” TO REBUT THE
WOMAN-PROTECTIVE RATIONALE
Despite its paternalism and inaccuracies, the woman-protective rationale has been a successful narrative in justifying abortion regulations, especially in the second trimester. 271 The success of the federal Partial Birth
Abortion Act, and the Court’s affirmation of it in Carhart, should be an ominous warning about how the Court would consider these other second-trimester abortion laws with similar justifications, especially as the Supreme
Court has become more conservative and hostile towards abortion rights in
recent years.
We argue in this Part that the silence in canonical abortion rights discourse about the uncomfortable aspects of second-trimester abortion has
given the woman-protective rationale more legitimacy and threatened abortion rights in the long term. We suggest that the abortion rights movement
should more openly discuss the complicated aspects of second-trimester
abortion—what emerging researchers and abortion providers have called
abortion “dangertalk.” 272 The authors—mostly abortion providers—who
coined the term used it to refer to aspects of abortion they see every day, but
the abortion rights movement considers too taboo to discuss openly. Specifically, the article described that providers “wrestl[e] with views of abortion
as killing, concerns (despite evidence against) about abortion causing fetal
pain, causing patients pain, and the gruesomeness of dealing with fetal
parts.” 273
Abortion providers rarely feel free to discuss dangertalk topics openly
or publicly. Rather, there is an assumption that if providers share their unfiltered abortion experiences, this will somehow threaten the success of the prochoice movement. In particular, fear exists that some of these topics will only

271

See id. at 159 (discussing that women need protection from a choice that may come to

regret).
272
273

Martin et. al, supra note 25, at 80.
Id.
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perpetuate current anti-abortion messaging. 274 The providers asked a provocative and radical question in their article: “What would happen if, rather than
shying away from the difficult, messy parts of abortion, the movement embraced them?” 275 After all, “[f]or these providers, struggling emotionally with
aspects of the work wasn’t troubling, it was how they knew they were still
thoughtful and engaged with the work.” Perhaps the same honesty would resonate with the public, many of whom likely struggle with some of these same
concerns, even those who support abortion rights. Although their original article was written to better support abortion providers, the authors also suggested that dangertalk could be a potent took to rejuvenate the abortion rights
movement. 276
Our Article sets out to do just that. We borrow the concept of dangertalk
and build on it. We explain how an embrace of dangertalk topics in the context of second-trimester abortion could improve both patient care and rebut
the woman-protective rationale. In Section A of this Part, we focus on two
areas: the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures and the complex
emotions second-trimester abortion can evoke for some patients. 277 Instead
of openly confronting these topics in the public domain, national pro-choice
messaging typically avoids them and pivots to comfortable talking points related to a woman’s autonomy. But this silence has allowed the anti-abortion
movement to control and monopolize the narrative surrounding these abortions, while also suggesting that pro-choice leaders are dishonest and evasive.
It also perpetuates abortion stigma by suggesting that women who terminate
with a Dilation and Evacuation (D&E) or after a prenatal diagnosis should be
silent. Ignoring these topics, in our opinion, is harming efforts to secure abortion rights. In Section B of this Part, we further argue that greater openness
about the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures and the range of
possible emotional responses following abortion will create the opportunity
for more patient choice. 278 We recognize the risks and challenges associated
with this openness, but aim to start the conversation of how embracing these
taboo topics can actually strengthen abortion rights. Put simply, the abortion
rights movement can best protect women by embracing radical transparency
and increased choice in second-trimester abortion care.

274

Id.
Id.
276 Id.
277 See infra notes 279–Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
278 See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–396 and accompanying text
275
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A. The Harm of Avoiding the Uncomfortable Truths
Second-trimester abortion care involves uncomfortable realities that
many in the abortion rights movement would rather not discuss. This Article
focuses on two in particular: First, second-trimester abortion procedures involve the removal of a fetus in parts. Second, abortion generally—and especially in the second trimester—can cause complicated emotions, including
grief. This Part also describes the harms of avoiding these uncomfortable realities.
In 2008, Lisa Harris, an abortion provider and professor at the University of Michigan medical school, wrote an article entitled “Second Trimester
Abortion Provision: Breaking the Silence and Changing the Discourse”—a
precursor to the dangertalk paper, which she also helped author. 279 In it, she
described the “violence in abortion, especially in second trimester procedures,” where the fetus is removed in parts. 280 She speaks openly about the
reality of a D&E procedure—including the simultaneous awe and disregard
she has for the fetal parts after the procedure ends. She notes that “there can
be legitimate feelings that first and second trimester abortions are qualitatively and emotionally different” because “[r]emoving a microscopic fetus
and gestational sac is visually and viscerally different from removing what
looks like a fully formed but small baby.” 281
Harris turns a critical eye on the movement she supports and notes that
“[t]he pro-choice movement has not owned or owned up to the reality of the
fetus, or the reality of fetal parts.” Instead, “the violence and, frankly, the
gruesomeness of abortion is owned only by those who would like to see abortion (at any time in pregnancy) disappear, by those who stand outside clinics
and in front of sports arenas holding placards with pictures of fetal parts and
partially dismembered fetal bodies.” 282 Harris has noted that the traditional
abortion-rights response to images of fetal parts on signs outside of abortion
clinics is dismissal—that the pictures are not real or that the falsely portray
what abortions look like. 283 It is true that the those images do not represent
first-trimester abortions, which are the vast majority of abortions, but to the
medical team performing second-trimester abortions, those poster images
279

Harris, supra note 26, at 74.
Id. at 76.
281 Id.
282 Id.; see also Lena R. Hann & Andrea Becker, The Option to Look: Patient-centered
pregnancy Tissue Viewing at Independent Abortion Clinics in the United States, 28(1) SEXUAL
& REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 500, 501 (2020) (“Most people can only learn about what
aborted fetal tissue looks like through anti-abortion imagery and misinformation.”)
283 Harris, supra note 26, at 77; see also ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 161 (explaining the strategic decision to not focus on
the specifics of the D&X procedure).
280
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may realistically look like the images they see during and after the procedure. 284
So how does Harris reconcile her abortion practice with the nature of
the procedure? At least some of it has to do with her belief—shared by many
abortion rights supporters—that “declining a woman’s request for abortion
[is] also . . . an act of unspeakable violence.” 285 It is violent to require a
woman to endure the significant risks and burdens of pregnancy and childbirth against her will, and for a child she does not want. 286 The irony is that
many people are disgusted when they hear the specifics of any invasive medical procedure, including childbirth, which can be quite gruesome. 287 Furthermore, the landmark Turnaway study has shown that women denied an abortion not only experience the physical trauma of birth, but also the long-term
negative effects on their mental and physical health, financial stability, and
life satisfaction. 288 Thus, there is no easy way out. Both giving and declining
a second-trimester abortion involves violence—the question is upon whom
will the violence be administered, the fetus or the woman?
We will pause here to note that the question of violence is likely iterative
of concerns regarding the moral value of the pregnancy. No one would discuss the surgical removal of an organ or tumor in terms of violence, no matter
how “gruesomely” it was removed. Yet for many people, even those who
support abortion rights, a fetus is categorically different than an organ or tumor because it is a potential life. 289 And therefore, the way the abortion occurs matters to these individuals, who might be uncomfortable with the idea
of removing a live fetus in parts, even if the fetus cannot feel pain until much
later in the pregnancy. Of course, this position is far from universal, and we
do not want to implicitly endorse any perspective on this matter by adopting
the term “violence” to describe an abortion procedure. Instead, we discuss
the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures without relying on any
descriptive, evocative terms.
284

Harris, supra note 26, at 77.
Id.
286 Id.; Elizabeth Kukura, Obstetric Violence, 106 GEO. L.J. 721, 730–34 (2018) (describing the unwanted, forced and in some situations, unconsented-to, surgeries that women are
experiencing in childbirth, such as cesareans, episiotomies, labor induction, and delivery using
vacuums and forceps);
287 See Maroney, supra note 268, at 900.
288 DIANA GREENE FOSTER, THE TURNAWAY STUDY: TEN YEARS, A THOUSAND WOMEN,
AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING—OR BEING DENIED—AN ABORTION (2020); Donley et.
al, The Legal and Medical Necessity of Abortion Care Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, 28 J.L.
& Biosciences 1,11 (2020).
289 See Maroney, supra note 268, at 901 (“The disgusting aspect of this procedure is regarded as noteworthy only because it involves destruction of a semi-developed fetus, and this
regard reflects a moral valuation—reliant on the belief system revealed above—of the status
and worth of that fetus.”).
285
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The second uncomfortable truth is the possible emotional complexity of
abortion for some women, a complexity more likely to present in secondtrimester abortion. 290 Two dominant narratives exist regarding a woman’s
emotional experience with abortion. The anti-abortion side claims that
women feel regret, and the abortion rights side claims that women feel relief. 291 These narratives are then used to portray these women either as victims who feel regret or as autonomous beings who feel relief. 292 Although
this is starting to change, canonical abortion rights discourse fails to recognize possibility of other emotions, much less the possibility of multiple emotions at once. 293
Though studies consistently demonstrate that the vast majority of
women who terminate a pregnancy feel relief, this finding is also reductive. 294
The relief a women may feel after an abortion does not negate other painful
emotions that may also exist. “Emotional responses to abortion are complex,
and it is natural to be simultaneously satisfied with a particular decision and
experience both painful and positive feelings.” 295 One study found that even
though relief was the most common emotional response to abortion, thirty
percent of women felt some (or all) negative emotions after their abortion. 296
Emotional complexity is even more likely in the second trimester with 57%
of women in one study reporting both positive and negative emotions, and
grief being the most commonly reported emotion, reported by 67% of
women. 297 Though grief was more common in women terminating intended
290 Andrea Becker & Lena R. Hann, “It Makes it More Real,” Examining Ambiguous
Fetal Meanings in Abortion Care, 272 Social Science & Medicine 1, 2 (2021) (describing grief
after abortion as a “thing we cannot say” in abortion rights discourse).
291 Jody Lynee Madeira, Aborted Emotions: Regret, Relationality, and Regulation, 21
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4–5 (2014).
292 Id. at 4; see Tracy A. Weitz et al., You Say “Regret” and I Say “Relief”: A Need to
Break the Polemic About Abortion, 78 CONTRACEPTION 87, 87 (2008) (describing the “relief/regret polemic”).
293 Corinne H. Rocca et al., Women’s Emotions One Week After Receiving or Being Denied an Abortion in the United States, 45 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH 122, 123 (2013) (“In the United States, where abortion is particularly politicized,
debates over its emotional effects have often focused on regret versus relief, while more complex emotional experiences have received less consideration. With a few exceptions, studies
have not quantitatively assessed the extent to which negative emotions—including regret—
are accompanied by positive ones.”).
294 Weitz et al., supra note 292, at 87; Corinne H. Rocca et al., Emotions And Decision
Rightness Over Five Years Following An Abortion: An Examination Of Decision Difficulty
And Abortion Stigma, 248 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 4 (2020).
295 Madeira, supra note 291, at 12; see also Weitz et al., supra note 292, at 88 (explaining
that emotions after abortion can range “from sadness to elation and everything in between, and
even many emotions simultaneously”).
296 Rocca et al., Emotions and Decision Rightness, supra note 287 at 4.
297 Inga-Maj Andersson, et al., Experiences, Feelings and Thoughts of Women Undergoing Second Trimester Medical Termination of Pregnancy, 9 PLoSOne 1, 9 (2014). Another
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pregnancies, the same study noted that a majority of women terminating unintended pregnancies in the second trimester also felt grief. 298 Women needing second-trimester abortion are also more likely to feel anxiety about fetal
pain; shame, stigma, and embarrassment due to the timing of the abortion;
and confusion and wariness due to lack of familiarity with the actual mechanics of second-trimester abortion. 299 The emphasis on relief ignores those
other possibly painful feelings and alienates women who have them. 300
One specific emotion abortion rights advocates have been careful to
avoid is the idea of “post-abortion grief.” 301 The fear is that acknowledging
abortion grief might be improperly equated with abortion regret. But “loss
and regret are two different things.” 302 It is entirely possible, and may even
be common, for a woman to feel that she made the best decision for herself,
yet still experience sadness or grief. One legal scholar has noted that “the
possibility of loss . . . does not trigger a moral or a legal claim against abortion—[i]nstead it seeks to open a wider space in which to discuss how women
may experience aspects of abortion.” 303 Acknowledging complex emotional
responses is “not a prediction or endorsement; it is simply recognition.” 304
“Even from a pro-choice point of view, we should understand what it is like
for a woman to choose abortion and what it is like for her to hold to that
choice with an image of her fetus in her mind’s eye.” 305 This sentiment is
only more powerful in the context of second trimester abortion when the fetus’s presence may be physically visible outside her body and she may have
felt it move inside her body.
Acknowledging and supporting women through these complex emotions, is not irreconcilable with the decision to terminate. Studies demonstrate
that women believe that abortion was the right choice regardless of complex
study noted that “[s]maller proportions of women in the first-trimester group than of those in
the near-limit group expressed regret (33% vs. 41%) and sadness (61% vs. 68%)” after their
abortion, even though over 90% of women in both groups felt relief. Rocca et al., Women’s
Emotions, supra note X, at 124.
298 Andersson, et al., supra note X, at 17. Professor Madeira uses the phrase “consented
but unwanted abortion” to help explain that a woman’s emotional experience with abortion is
complicated. Madeira, supra note 291, at 51. These are women who consent to the abortion,
but “might choose differently if circumstances were other than what they are—if they had a
healthy fetus, more economic resources, greater flexibility with employment or education, or
stronger social supports to make parenthood a workable option.” Id. at 52.
299 Andersson, et al., supra note X, at 10-13. See also Purcell et al., supra note X at 178–
79 (explaining that women can find second-trimester abortion “a largely unknown, unexpected, and challenging process”).
300 Weitz et al., supra note 292, at 88.
301 Madeira, supra note 291, at 22.
302 SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION, supra note 214, at 133.
303 Id. at 134.
304 Id. at 133.
305 Id. at 135.
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or negative emotions. 306 Indeed, 84% of women whose primary emotional
response to abortion was negative, felt that abortion was the correct choice
one week later. 307 Even among women who reported feeling regret, 89% of
them thought they had made the right choice one week later. 308 “Despite the
common framing of emotional outcomes as either relief or regret, nine in
[ten] women in the near-limit group who reported regret also reported relief.” 309 This demonstrates that the public framing of post-abortion emotions
is inconsistent with many women’s lived experiences.
The national abortion rights messaging avoids both of these uncomfortable truths for the same reason—the risk of ceding ground to the anti-abortion
movement. 310 They may also be worried that transparency about the nature
of second-trimester abortion procedures could harm the women seeking the
abortion, who remain steadfast in their choice, but feel more distressed or
guilty about the procedure. Similarly, the pro-choice movement is worried
that discussing potential feelings of loss after an abortion may sound dangerously close to regret. 311 Any acknowledgement of complex emotions including possible grief or loss, would “be celebrated” by the anti-abortion side “as
an authentic moment of true confession” that the abortion was a mistake. 312
As a result, pro-choice activists have strategically avoided discussing the
emotional complexity of abortion as a potential strategy. 313 Even worse, “[i]n
pro-choice scripts, a woman who does feel regret or remorse seems at best
confused and non-autonomous and at worst a traitor to women’s rights or
feminism.” 314 Little room for nuance exists in canonical pro-choice discourse.
The studied silence approach was famously unsuccessful in Carhart.
The abortion rights movement made serious errors in defending the Dilation
and Extraction (D&X) abortion procedure.315 When confronted with arguments about the “gruesomeness” of the procedure, abortion rights activists
306 Andersson, et al., supra note X, at 20; Rocca et al., Emotions And Decision Rightness,
supra note 287 at 4.
307 Rocca et al., Women’s Emotions, supra note X, at 127.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Purcell et. al., supra note 38, at 166.
311 SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION, supra note 214, at 133.
312 Id.; see also Weitz et al., supra note 292, at 87 (describing the difficult balance of
honestly discussing a woman’s emotional needs regarding abortion “without ceding ground to
those who use these needs to develop regulations that will make abortion illegal and/or less
available”).
313 SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION, supra note 214, at 133.
314 Madeira, supra note 291, at 39.
315 See Jeanie Ludlow, Sometimes It’s a Child and a Choice: Toward an Embodied Abortion Praxis, 20:1 NAT’L WOMEN’S STUDIES ASSOC. J. 26, 38-39 (2008). (describing the prochoice failed defenses that the procedure was rare and only in cases where the woman’s health
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ignored the particulars of the procedure and attempted to re-focus the discussion exclusively on “politically correct” stories—the stories of women who
had a D&X after learning of fetal anomaly in a wanted pregnancy. 316 But this
was misleading, as the majority of women who had a D&X did so without
fetal anomaly, making the movement look dishonest and untrustworthy, while
at the same time perpetuating the dichotomy of the “good” and “bad” abortion. The silent approach also capitulated the narrative to anti-abortion activists—who take advantage of it—inundating Americans with the uncontradicted narrative that the procedure itself was inhumane. 317 The anti-abortion
strategy has long focused on the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures, ensuring that the public is well aware of the pictures of fetuses and
fetal parts. 318 They set the stage, painting the picture of exactly how “gruesome” the procedure is. The lack of a response makes abortion rights activists
look like they are hiding something. 319
This silence trap is also the paradigmatic way that stigma operates:
“[s]tigma keeps people silent about their personal experiences, and silence
feeds public complacency with political attacks and destructive myths.” 320
Thus, later abortions, and abortions on the basis of fetal anomaly, become
or the fetus’s health were at issue); see also ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE L. IN AM., supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 160 (describing the “public relations nightmare” that occurred when an abortion rights advocate admitted that thousands of D&X abortions were performed, instead of the hundreds he had initially estimated); Madeira, supra note 291, at 24
(“After the Partial Birth Abortion Act’s passage . . . advocates first claimed the technique was
‘used rarely and largely in cases of fetal anomaly or death’ instead of educating why the procedure was safer than others, resulting in a ‘loss of credibility’ and a loss of opportunity for
public education.”).
316 See supra note 315 and accompanying text (discussing the approach abortion rights
activists took).
317 See Ludlow, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 41 (describing the prochoice response to the “gruesomeness” of the D&X as “disappointingly weak”).
318 Ludlow, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 37.
319 Id. at 38–39. Other misinformation that the silence surrounding the specifics of abortion procedures can perpetuate was the Center for Medical Progress’s release of heavily edited
videos purporting to show that abortion clinics were selling fetal tissue and “baby parts.”
Planned Parenthood later sued the Center and was awarded over $2 million in compensatory
and punitive damages and injunctive relief. See generally Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am.,
Inc., v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, No. 16–cv–00236–WHO, 2020 WL 2065700 (9th Cir. Apr. 29,
2020) (holding that Planned Parenthood was entitled to relief due to trespass, fraudulent misrepresentations, fraud, and violation of numerous recording laws). The National Abortion Federation has also obtained injunctive relief against the Center for Medical Progress. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 685 Fed. App’x. 623 (9th Cir. 2017) These lies would be
less possible if clinics were more transparent as to their operations—including when and why
aborted fetal tissue is donated and the important, life-saving research that it enables.
320
#Goodbye
Stigma,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-pacific-southwest/campaigns/goodbye-stigma [https://perma.cc/DP6T-MKCJ].
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shameful because they aren’t often discussed. 321 Greater openness can help
the movement destigmatize this care. We acknowledge the valid fears that the
public would be disturbed by the specifics of second-trimester abortion procedures and would not understand memory-making. 322 But silence has not
kept these uncomfortable truths hidden.
Perhaps transparency could do better. After all, with the exception of
absolutists on both sides of the spectrum, most people’s views on abortion
are nuanced. 323 And acknowledging and recognizing the complexity of abortion might humanize the issues. Admittedly, pithy messages—like “my body,
my choice”—are easier to communicate and comprehend. Transparency
about second-trimester abortion procedures and the emotional complexity
surrounding these procedures does not translate into an easily digestible message. But one can see threads of our proposal in newer campaigns like, “Shout
Your Abortion,” where women are attempting to de-stigmatize abortion care
generally. 324 These women are telling their stories with the nuance that is often ignored in public messaging. This nuance is vitally important and far superior to the stigmatizing silence that capitulates the narrative to the antiabortion community. 325
B. Improving Abortion Care by Increasing Choice
Thus far, we have endorsed a new strategy that more openly confronts
the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures and the emotional complexity that second-trimester abortion can evoke for some women. In this
section, we argue that this greater openness on the uncomfortable truths of
321

Later abortions have always been the subject of abortion stigma. See generally Norris
et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (discussing the stigma associated with abortion). Historically, however, abortions based on fetal anomaly were considered some of the
least stigmatized abortions. Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, supra note X, at 62627. But as the national conversation related to disability discrimination has shifted over time,
that assumption is changing.
322 See Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 505 (explaining that even some staff at a clinic
do not understand “why a patient would request to view tissue”); see also Jill Wieber Lens,
Tort Law’s Devaluation of Stillbirth, 18 NEV. L. J. 955, 965–66 (2019) (explaining that the
public does not understand why a woman would want to hold her stillborn child).
323 For instance, as noted above, most Americans support abortion in some, but not all,
circumstances. Only 8% support abortion in all cases throughout pregnancy, and only sixteen
percent are opposed to it in all cases throughout pregnancy. Crary & Fingerhut, supra note 12.
Eighty percent fall in the middle.
324 Shout Your Abortion, SHOUTYOURABORTION.COM, https://shoutyourabortion.com/
[https://perma.cc/69EG-WCQE].
325 And some pithiness may still be possible. Professor Madeira recently applauded
Planned Parenthood’s 2014 “Not in Her Shoes” campaign, which attempts to move beyond
the simplistic labels “pro-choice” and “pro-life”—for its effort to move away from the easy,
traditional narratives. Madeira, supra note 291, at 22–23.
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second-trimester abortion could more effectively rebut the woman-protective
rationale and improve patient care. We imagine a consent-based framework
in which women who receive second-trimester abortions are given the option
to learn more about the specifics of the D&E abortion procedure, alternative
procedures, and the option of memory making. We then describe how this
patient-centered transparency—and the choices that come with it—will do
more to rebut the woman-protective rationale than simply refuting the underlying premises.
Though we are advocating for more patient choice, it is worth noting at
the outset that disclosures in the context of abortion care have a long and
frustrating history. Abortion has been singled out for special treatment time
and time again. 326 Unlike other medical procedures, where doctors are trusted
to obtain consent before providing the care and policed after-the-fact by tort
law, state laws often mandate particular disclosures before abortion and require waiting periods thereafter. Those mandated disclosures often encourage
childbirth over abortion or flat out lie: providers might have to disclosure,
incorrectly, that fetuses feel pain, that personhood starts at conception, or that
abortion is psychologically harmful, hurts future fertility, or could cause
breast cancer. 327 Some might worry that suggesting additional disclosures is
tone deaf to this reality and would only increase the burden on abortion providers.
We argue below, however, that more information on abortion procedures
and more resources to help patients process complex emotions could on the
whole be very helpful for second-trimester patients. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that every patient needs to receive the same information. Outside
of legally mandate disclosures, the abortion counseling community already
operates on the presumption that “abortion care is not a one-size-fits-all proposition” and that patients need to be met where they are. 328 Patients are provided the counseling that they need. If a woman has already reflected on the
decision, is certain of her choice, and not experiencing complex emotions
about it, she should not be forced to sit through additional, unnecessary disclosures that may make her feel like she should feel more complicated.
It can be a challenge to identify the patients that need extra counseling
and resources. Fortunately, some providers have started using tools to help
them. Some, for instance, use an intake form that asks patients about their
level of certainty about the abortion and their beliefs about the pregnancy,
including whether they view the fetus as a child. 329 Patients who indicate
326

Cohen & Jofee, supra note X, at 157.
Id. at 149-50.
328 Id. at 146.
329 Id. at 169.
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more uncertainty or moral ambiguity about the abortion will receive more indepth counseling. This patient-controlled approach squares nicely with our
proposal. In our view, every second-trimester abortion patient should have
the opportunity to learn more about the D&E procedure, possible alternatives,
and resources to help them process complex emotions. But only if they want
or need it. Therefore, when we explain below how dangertalk subjects should
be incorporated into patient care, we are doing so with the endorsement of
models that allow women to opt out if they do not want to know more. And
because the second-trimester abortion patient population is so small, it should
not be overly burdensome to provide.
In Subsection 1, we discuss how transparency beyond informed consent with regard to abortion procedures can promote greater patient autonomy
and patient choice in second-trimester abortion care. 330 In Subsection 2, we
discuss how abortion providers can help patients process complex emotions
through memory making. 331
1. Transparency Beyond Informed Consent
In Carhart, Justice Kennedy suggested that because the decision to terminate is “so fraught with emotional consequence,” some providers may not
wish to provide patients with details of the procedures, and instead, only disclose what is required, such as potential risks of the procedure. 332 As Carhart
implies, informed consent law does not require transparency about the particulars of a procedure. 333 Before a patient has their appendix removed, for
instance, physicians are not required to explain the exact details of how the
appendix will be removed. 334 Similarly, informed consent law does not require a doctor to disclose the specifics of an abortion procedure. Instead, it
simply requires that doctors explain the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the
procedure, which abortion providers do as a matter of course before every
abortion. 335

330

See infra notes 332–Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
See infra notes 355–396 and accompanying text.
332 Carhart v. Gonzales, 500 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
333 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 21.9, at 513 (2d ed. 2016) (“[T]he
materiality rule does not require detailed disclosure of methods unless they are unusual or
affect the risks.”); see also Masquat v. Magurie, 638 P.2d 1105, 1105 (Okla. 1981) (ruling that
disclosure of the different methods of performing a tubal ligation was not required).
334 DOBBS ET AL., supra note X, at 513.
335 Id. Some states mandate that a “description of the proposed abortion method” be disclosed beforehand as part of informed consent statutes. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-161703(b)(1)(B)(i) (West 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. 65-6709(a)(2); LA. REV. STAT. §
1061.17(B)(3)(b)(i) (West 2020).
331
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Even if not required, however, explaining the details of the abortion procedure has real benefits. First, it fights against the critique that abortion providers are hiding important facts from women. With transparency that exceeds legal requirements, the state can no longer claim the need to protect
women from the regret they will feel once they learn of the “gruesomeness”
of the D&E procedure. 336 If it is “precisely this lack of information concerning the way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern to
the State,’” then giving women this information will remove the state’s
woman-protective interest. It would also rebut the argument that women need
to be protected from doctors because providers are misleading and hiding
information from their patients. We suspect this above-and-beyond transparency will be more effective than calling out the sexist stereotypes that suggest
women need protection.
Moreover, the anti-abortion movement has been able to find women to
testify in amicus briefs that no one disclosed the nature of the D&E before
the abortion, and that once they learned of the specifics, they regretted their
decision—the same type of stories offered during the D&X litigation. 337
These stories create misleading facts that harm abortion rights in both litigation and the public image. If doctors routinely disclosed the particulars of the
D&E procedure, these briefs would be more difficult to support. 338 Though
abortion providers do not need to dwell on the details of the procedure,
women should have the opportunity to learn that their fetus will be removed
in parts and that, though there is no evidence to suggest a fetus can feel pain
before twenty-nine weeks, the fetus will die during the course of the procedure unless fetal demise is induced beforehand. 339

336 Def.’s Mem. In Opp. To Plf.’s Motion For Prelim. Injun., Bernard v. Individual Members of Indiana Med. Licensing Bd., at 14, No. 1:19–cv–1660–SEB–DML (S.D. Ind. May 17,
2019) (citations omitted).
337 See generally Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and
180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Gonzales v. Carhart, No. 05–380, 2006 WL 1436684, at *17 (U.S. 2006) (discussing receiving over 3,500
pages of testimony from women describing their post-abortion experiences).
338 If every second trimester abortion patient were given this information, it would theoretically be impossible to find women to sign onto similar briefs absent perjury. However,
patient memories regarding informed consent are far from perfect, and perjury might be more
common for abortion rights litigation where individuals feel like their false testimony could
“save unborn lives.”
339 See Soc’y of Fam. Planning, Induction Of Fetal Demise Before Abortion, supra note
85, at 464 (“A multidisciplinary review of the medical evidence concluded that a fetus cannot
experience pain until 29 weeks of gestation at the earliest, when thalamocortical connections
are first present.”).
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Transparency also promotes patient autonomy. Only when providers
disclose comprehensive information can a woman “act[] with true procreative liberty” and autonomy. 340 Once the disclosure is made about the nature
of the procedure, women who have genuine concerns may decide not to terminate. For instance, some women might feel a connection to their fetus that
could make them more concerned about how a termination occurs. “It is disingenuous to argue that removing a fetus is no different from removing a
fibroid”—at least for some women. 341 If this information could change some
women’s minds about whether to receive the abortion or what kind of abortion they desire, it should be provided. No abortion provider wants women to
have abortions they don’t want. 342 Though we think very few women would
reach this conclusion, they should have the information that would allow
them to.
This transparency also opens the possibility of greater choice in secondtrimester abortion care. In particular, women should be presented with the
various types of second-trimester abortion so that they can choose between
them. Giving patients more choices over the procedure would more clearly
mirror first-trimester abortion practice, where options for both medication
abortion or surgical abortion exist. 343 Currently, in second-trimester abortion
care, women are typically only given the option of a D&E. 344 We believe
women should have the option of learning about alternatives, including induction abortion and the possibility of inducing fetal demise before either a
D&E or D&X. An induction abortion or D&X might be particularly helpful
or appealing for women terminating a wanted pregnancy or those who have
emotionally connected with their fetus. These women are more likely to experience grief and desire closure. For some women, induction abortion could
also ease the stigma associated with abortion by creating an experience that
mimics and even looks like stillbirth. 345
But even women who do not feel an emotional connection to their fetus
might still be anxious about the nature of the procedure. Qualitative research
demonstrates that some women are more comfortable to know that their fetus
340 Seema Mohapatra, Law in the Time of Zika: Disability Rights and Reproductive Justice
Collide, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 325, 352 (2019).
341 Harris, supra note 26, at 75.
342 Cohen & Joffe, supra note X, at 149.
343 See generally Wendy Simonds et al., Abortion, Revised: Participants in the U.S. Clinical Trials Evaluate Mifepristone, 46:10 SOC. SCI. MED. 1313 (1998) (describing a woman’s
choices and experiences regarding different first-trimester abortion methods).
344 See generally Donovan, supra note 109 (discussing the implications of banning D&E
abortion procedures on second-trimester abortions).
345 Stillbirth, however, can also create its own stigma with some characteristics similar to
abortion stigma. See Pollock, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 166 (discussing
stigma associated with abortion and stillbirth).
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had died before a D&E began, while other women find it disturbing to carry
a dead fetus before an abortion. 346 Given these varied preferences, the best
solution is to give women the option of fetal demise before an abortion, if she
desires. Providing this additional option would rebut the argument presented
in the states’ briefs that women prefer fetal demise even though it is typically
not performed, and it should therefore be mandated. 347 If a patient chooses
fetal demise, the provider could also discuss the possibility of a D&X, which
would become legal.
Of course, women should also be told of the costs and risks associated
with these alternative procedures. With respect to fetal demise before a D&X
or D&E, women should first be told unequivocally that no evidence exists
that a fetus can feel pain in the second trimester—which might relieve any
discomfort women have at the idea of a D&E or D&X without fetal demise. 348 If the woman still desires fetal demise, she should be told that the
primary method for inducing demise involves injecting a life-ending medication into the fetus’s heart, ant that this procedure involves extra risks and
discomfort, increased costs, and a longer abortion experience. 349 The other
method of fetal demise does not create addition risks and burdens, but is also
less reliable and might not work in an individual case.
As to induction abortion, it can be prohibitively expensive given that it
often requires days of inpatient care at a hospital. 350 Many women may not
be able to afford this unless their insurance will cover the cost—an unlikely
scenario. 351 And even if a woman could afford the extremely high out-ofpocket cost, most hospitals do not offer it. 352 Induction abortion is also a
longer, riskier, and potentially more painful procedure that can take days and
still require surgical removal of the placenta. 353 As a result, this will not be
the ideal method for the vast majority of second-trimester abortions, unless
there is an indication for fetal autopsy or a strong desire to meet and hold the
child. This explains why only 2% of second trimester abortions are done by
346

McNamara et al., supra note 120, at 517.
Soc’y of Fam. Planning, Induction Of Fetal Demise Before Abortion, supra note 85, at
465–66.
348 See id. (noting that by best estimates, fetal pain starts around twenty-nine weeks).
349 Id.; Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, supra note 56,
at 232–33.
350 Donovan, supra note 109, at 37.
351 Adam Sonfield, Restrictions on Private Insurance Coverage of Abortion: A Danger to
Abortion Access and Better U.S. Health Coverage, GUTTMACHER INST. (June 6, 2018),
https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2018/06/restrictions-private-insurance-coverage-abortiondanger-abortion-access-and-better-us [https://perma.cc/EQ3C-ZFT8].
352 For instance, many states have prohibited public hospitals from offering abortion services. See e.g., COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 209.
353 Donovan, supra note 109, at 37.
347
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induction, but it is the primary method for second and third trimester abortions after twenty weeks in the case of fetal anomaly. 354
It is worth noting that a particular abortion provider might not be able
to provide all these alternative procedures. Clinics—where 95% of abortions
take place—do not typically offer induction abortions. Individual providers
also may not be trained on how to induce fetal demise, or only have training
on one method for inducing fetal demise. As a result, they may not be able to
provide the options women seek. And if the provider can induce fetal demise,
she might still not know how to perform a D&X, if requested. Many women
will likely not be able to afford options that cost additional money, even if
they want to. We recognize that in this context, describing to women options
that do not practically exist may not provide any benefits. We nevertheless
paint this picture of an ideal world of second-trimester abortion care, where
women are given meaningful choice, even if we are not there yet. Regardless
of whether the physician can offer additional choices for women, we still believe that, in the interest of transparency and empowered decision-making,
women should have the choice to learn more about the nature of the abortion
procedure and alternatives. And providers can always refer the patient to
other providers, even out of state providers, who offer more choices if the
patient desires it.

2. Recognizing Emotional Complexity through Optional Memory-Making
The canonical pro-choice script is that women feel relief after abortion,
which empirically, is the most common and lasting emotional response to
abortion. 355 But focusing on relief as the only emotional response to abortion
does not further the “overall goal” of supporting a woman’s mental and physical health. 356 To best help and empower women, researchers emphasize the
need to broaden the discussion of emotional experience—to “not be afraid to
acknowledge the full range of feelings women have about abortion.” 357 Insisting on relief alienates the almost thirty percent of women who experience
more complex emotions, including grief or loss. 358 Instead, we must have
more open and flexible dialogue so that women feel comfortable being honest
about their feelings towards abortion. 359 “Greater visibility has the potential
to improve understandings of the ways in which women’s experiences are
354 Soc’y of Family Planning, Clinical Guidelines, Labor Induction Abortion in the Second
Trimester, 84 CONTRACEPTION 4, 4 (2011).
355 Rocca et al., Emotions And Decision Rightness, supra note 355, at 4.
356 Weitz et al., supra note 292, at 88.
357 Id.
358 Rocca et al., Emotions And Decision Rightness, supra note 355, at 4.
359 Madeira, supra note 291, at 13.
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framed and constrained by the dominant narratives of pregnancy and abortion.” 360 Of course, we are not suggesting that grief or loss are pervasive or
proper responses to abortion—far from it—rather, we are suggesting that
grief or loss are reasonable responses that can be better supported.
By recognizing this reality, we can also improve patient care. At the outset, simply recognizing the possibility of these emotions and holding space
for women who experience them could help women feel less confused and
isolated when they occur. Many of the best abortion providers—particularly
those with a second-trimester abortion practice—already do this. 361 But more
concretely, abortion providers can also offer patients the option of memorymaking to support those who are experiencing loss or grief process their emotions. The idea of memory-making comes from modern medical treatment for
parents after stillbirth; it simply gives parents the opportunity to make memories with the child. 362 Those opportunities can include viewing, holding, or
spending time with their child, taking pictures, or obtaining mementos, like
footprints. It can be as extensive or as minimal as the woman desires, and can
include spiritual or ceremonial acts like prayer, pseudo-baptism, or cremation
/burial. Empirical research of parents who have experienced stillbirth confirms the benefits of memory-making for processing grief. 363 Memory-making is also standard within PHPC for parents continuing a pregnancy where
the baby is not expected to survive long past birth. 364
Numerous anti-abortion state legislatures acknowledge the psychological benefits of memory-making. It is one purported reason for why they ban
360

Purcell et. al., supra note 38, at 166.
See Cohen & Joffe, supra note X, at 164-70 (describing the experience of providers
praying with patients and helping them work through their feelings).
362 See Position Statement: Bereaved Parents Holding Their Baby, PREGNANCY LOSS &
INFANT DEATH ALLIANCE (2008; revised 2016), http://childrensroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/plida_statement_holding_baby_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C7EV-GQR3]
(“The modern standard of care is to offer grieving parents repeated and extended opportunities
to have close contact with their baby.”); see also Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 264, at 11
(describing standardized procedure in the UK to offer “photographs and footprints, and
strongly encourag[e] parents to hold their stillborn infant” and describing the importance of
clinician empathy); Lens, Tort Law’s Devaluation of Stillbirth, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 966–67 (describing changes in medical care after stillbirth).
363 See Elizabeth Kirkley-Best & Kenneth R. Kellner, The Forgotten Grief: A Review of
the Psychology of Stillbirth, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 420, 426 (1982) (describing that
research shows “almost unanimous agreement that seeing and holding the infant is helpful in
successful grief resolution”); see also Lens, Tort Law’s Devaluation of Stillbirth, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 966–67 (describing changes in medical care after stillbirth).
364 PHPC researchers explain that giving parents the opportunity to spend time with their
child and providing “[t]angible keepsakes promote healthy grieving and . . . helps parents to
weave the baby’s story into the fabric of their lives.” Amy Kuebelbeck & Erin M. DenneyKoelsch, supra note 164, at 70 (internal citations omitted).
361
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abortion in the context of fetal anomalies or encourage PHPC for women
after a life-threatening fetal diagnosis. The fact that the traditional abortion
rights narrative has ignored the complex emotions women can experience after abortion plays into the state’s argument. Simply put, the state’s justification that women are better off continuing a pregnancy after a life-threatening
fetal diagnosis assumes that women can only experience memory-making if
they continue the pregnancy after the diagnosis. This is incorrect. Memorymaking is also possible with abortion and would benefit many women who
choose abortion in the second trimester. In fact, PHPC researchers advocate
for memory-making in abortion care:
[t]hose who terminate a desired pregnancy for a [life-limiting fetal
diagnosis] often experience intense grief that may have some similarities to those who carry to term. Some desire memory-making
rituals similar to those who carry to term. Whatever the reasons,
these families deserve compassionate care throughout their experience, opportunities for memory-making, and expert bereavement
support. 365
Some abortion providers already offer this optional care to varying extents. 366 For decades, some abortion clinics and hospitals that provide abortion have given women the opportunity to create footprints or see their fetal
tissue after abortion, including holding an intact fetus if desired. 367 Some providers also connect a woman to a bereavement doula, who specializes in helping women create memories, often free of charge. 368 A 2020 study on patient
viewing of fetal tissue post-abortion specifically noted a possible connection

365

Id. at 64; see also Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 508 (summarizing providers’
explanations that “abortions for anomalies require the most empathy and care, and often include additional services like ink hand and footprints, or memorial certificates”); See Carol
Joffe, Working with Dr. Tiller: Staff Recollections Of Women's Health Care Services of Wichita, 43 Perspectives on Sexual & Reproductive Health 199, 199-204 (2011) (describing an
abortion practice that asked patients “whether they wished to see and hold their baby after
delivery and whether they wanted pictures, blankets and footprints as keepsakes. They were
also asked to contemplate whether they wanted a baptism or other religious ceremony, and
whether they wished to have their baby's ashes shipped to them after cremation at WHCS.”).
366 Ludlow, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 45.
367 Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 501.
368 Though some bereavement doulas will only work with clients facing stillbirth or late
miscarriage, many will also assist women who are terminating due to a health diagnosis. E.g.,
Life-Limiting Diagnosis, PITTSBURGH BEREAVEMENT DOULAS, https://pittsburghbereavementdoulas.com/life-limiting-diagnosis/ [https://perma.cc/6YTY-WK7V].
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between viewing of fetal tissue after abortion and memory-making after stillbirth and miscarriage. 369 Though memory making in the context of abortion
makes many abortion rights supporters uncomfortable, women should be able
to benefit from memory-making regardless of whether their pregnancy ends
naturally or by choice. 370And integrating memory-making into abortion care
undercuts any state’s claim that PHPC is psychologically superior to abortion
for women after a life-threatening fetal diagnosis because women can access
the benefit without the corresponding restrictions.
The availability of some memory-making opportunities depends on the
type of abortion procedure—meaning that state restrictions on types of procedures not only restrict a woman’s choices, but also her opportunities to
make memories. This is despite the state’s acknowledgment of the benefits
of memory-making within PHPC. An induction abortion, for instance, allows
a woman to hold her baby without any physical impairments.371 A D&X abortion allows similar opportunities without the extra time, expense, or need for
inpatient care, including holding the baby, albeit with some trauma to the
fetus’s head. Holding the baby is often not possible after a D&E because the
fetus is not intact, but other memories are possible. Women can, for instance,
create mementoes from the heartbeat sound, have special ultrasound pictures
taken, have footprints and handprints made, name the child, or have the remains cremated or buried. 372 These opportunities for memory-making exist
regardless of the type of abortion procedure. 373 It is also possible that a D&E
would allow for the viewing of fetal tissue with proper counseling on what to
expect.
Most women having a second-trimester abortion, however, are not ending a wanted pregnancy. As a result, they may be less likely to desire memorymaking. This Article still advocates, however, for giving all women the

369 Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 500–01 (explaining fetal tissue viewing after abortion and noting that patients “are allowed and sometimes even encouraged to memorialize the
fetus” after stillbirth and miscarriage).
370 Ludlow, supra note X, at 28, 46. This avoidance is no different from the reproductive
rights’ avoidance of miscarriage and stillbirth given that any acknowledgement of a woman’s
feelings of loss supposedly evidences fetal personhood. Lens, Miscarriage, Stillbirth & Reprod. Just., supra note 165, at 4.
371 See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text (discussing the induction abortion
procedure).
372 See Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 508 (explaining that some patients request hand
and footprints).
373 Id.
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choice of memory-making within their second-trimester abortion experience. 374 Many women with undesired pregnancies experienced some uncertainty surrounding their decision to terminate in the second trimester.375 As
a result, the woman likely spent more time thinking about the fetus and imagining her life if she continued the pregnancy; in some cases, she might have
developed an emotional bond with the fetus as time went on. She might even
be showing or have felt the fetus move. 376 In a study of second trimester abortion patients, half of the patients terminating due to fetal anomaly chose to
view the fetus, as did 39% of women terminating for unintended pregnancy. 377 Both women who viewed the fetus and those who did not said that
they did not regret their choice. 378 A 2020 survey of clinics offering patient
viewing of fetal tissue also described that some women feel closure after the
viewing. 379
The choice of memory-making can also be empowering for women.
Providers that already give patients the option of viewing pregnancy tissue
after abortion believe doing so is part of their mission to allow the patient to
make their own decisions. 380 This practice has been coined “patient centered
pregnancy tissue viewing” or PCV to note that it is the patient’s choice, as
distinct from legally-mandated viewings, like laws that force ultrasounds before abortion. 381 These providers believe that women who choose to view the
fetal tissue benefit due to “exercising choice and control during the abortion.” 382 Providers believe that a patient’s “access to information” and the
choice to see the fetus are integral to creating trust in the patient-provider
relationship, whether the patient looks “to fulfill curiosity, to cope with or
grieve the end of a pregnancy, or merely come to terms with the experience.” 383 Though fetal viewing may be empowering for some, only a minority
of women are likely choose it. In Ludlow’s estimate, only about five percent

374 But see Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 507–08 (“Providers note a stark contrast in
patient-centered pregnancy tissue viewing (PCV) approaches for patients who have abortions
due to fetal anomalies compared to patients who have abortions for other reasons.”).
375 Ludlow, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 40.
376 Id. at 41; see also SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION, supra note 214, at 132–33 (explaining
that women who terminate pregnancies because of their circumstances—insufficient income,
the lack of a supportive partner, the lack of other support, the lack of medical insurance—may
wish their circumstances were different so that they could continue the pregnancy and may
feel attached and grieve after termination).
377 Anderson et al., supra note X, at 8.
378 Id. at 19.
379 Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 504, 506–07.
380 Id. at 505.
381 Id. at 500, 505.
382 Id. at 507.
383 Id. at 505.
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of women chose to see the “post-procedure fetus,” 384 but studies in the second
trimester suggest that over a third of women might chose it if it were offered. 385 Though 75% of clinics offer viewing, three quarters of them only do
so upon patient request, meaning that many women never realized it was an
option, potentially diluting this service.386 We are aware of no studies that
demonstrate the prevalence of other methods for memory making that might
be less emotionally difficult—including having footprints made or cremating
the fetus.
It is important to note that giving women space and resources to mourn
their abortion can only be accomplished effectively if women are also free
from any pressure to grieve when they do not feel complex emotions. If optional memory-making became standardized, a risk of what Professor Carol
Sanger calls “compulsory mourning” exists. 387 When “bereavement practices
become officially entrenched, they may take on a prescriptive quality, providing a template for how one is supposed to respond to death.” 388 For instance,
an Indiana law has been criticized for its requirement that women bury or
cremate fetal or embryonic remains after an abortion, miscarriage, stillbirth
as priming women to experience the emotional response of grief, regardless
of their actual experience. 389 Sanger also argued against state-issued memorial birth certificates after stillbirth due to the risk of compulsory mourning. 390
Similarly, the very offer that women could make memories after abortion
could make them feel as if they should be grieving. Compulsory mourning is
384

Ludlow, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 46 (explaining that some
women also chose to see because they are curious or want a sense of finality).
385 Anderson et al., supra note X, at 19. “Clinics participating in a 2020 study on patient
viewing of fetal tissue after abortion responded that it occurs only occasionally or rarely,
though it was not certain whether women were aware they could ask to see their fetal tissue.”
Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 503.
386 Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 504.
387 See Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem
for Law, 100 CAL. L.R. 269, 300–02 (2012) (providing an overview of “compulsory mourning”).
388 Id. at 300.
389 Emma Green, State-Mandated Mourning for Aborted Fetuses, THE ATLANTIC (May
14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/state-mandated-mourningfor-aborted-fetuses/482688/ [https://perma.cc/2WJS-74TL].
390 Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem for Law,
supra note 387, at 301. Professor Lens counters Sanger’s arguments against stillbirth birth
certificates. See Lens, Miscarriage, Stillbirth & Reprod. Just., supra note 165, at 50–52 (discussing the cost potential out-of-pocket costs for autopsies following a stillbirth); see also
Lens, Tort Law’s Devaluation of Stillbirth, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
1008–09 (discussing the “tension between abortion and recognition of still birth”). Importantly, like the choice to engage in memory-making, stillbirth birth certificates are voluntary. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.0022 (West) (“a parent may obtain a certificate of birth resulting in stillbirth”) (emphasis added).
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alienating to those who do not have that same response to abortion—those
who do not feel loss.
Importantly, the risk of compulsory mourning is lessened if the offer of
memory-making comes from the doctor or counselor instead of the state. For
instance, abortion providers already refer to the fetus as a baby only if the
woman does so. 391 It is very different for a doctor to follow the woman’s lead
by saying “baby” than for the state to officially classify a fetus as a baby or
mandating the use of the word “baby” in informed consent statutes. Similarly,
a doctor asking a woman if she is interested in burial or cremation is very
different than a state requirement that parents bury their fetus’s remains (and
patients or providers pay for it). Even more on point, a doctor advising a
woman of the availability of PHPC—which we recommend given its benefits—does not send the same signal as the state’s requirement that a woman
consider it—which we denounce. Finally, the consent-based framework we
outlined above would also allow providers to offer the service only to those
patients who are interested in learning more about it.
The risk of compulsory mourning may also be exaggerated. A 2020
study explained that there was a dearth of studies available examining
women’s experiences viewing their fetal tissue, but the few conducted revealed that although most women did not wish to see the fetal tissue, they
appreciated having the choice to view. 392 A study done in Canada where
abortion providers asked women if they wanted to view the products of conception after the abortion. 393 A little over a quarter said yes. The majority of
women who participated (83%) reported that the experience did not make
their abortion more emotionally difficult, although the study concerned firsttrimester abortion. 394 In other words, so long as abortion providers are
thoughtful in offering the options, making clear that many women will not be
interested, it shouldn’t necessarily signal expectations that a woman experience a particular response.
Needless to say, the method by which providers offer women opportunities for memory-making is important. 395 A woman should be told of its
availability while making clear that not all women find any form of memorymaking helpful, and maybe also that most do not. If women do choose to see
391

Ludlow, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 43.
Hann & Becker, supra note 282, at 501.
393 SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION, supra note 214, at 148.
394 Id.
395 In the Hann & Becker study, the clinics that allowed patient tissue viewing offered it
in different ways. “The majority allow it if the patient requests (75%) and others offer PCV
verbally (usually during pre-abortion counselling) or in writing via intake paperwork.” Hann
& Becker, supra note 282, at 503. “Fifty-six percent of the clinics do not have a specific policy
although PCV is available to those who ask.” Id.
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the fetus as part of memory-making, they must be prepared. “Two clinics
specified that patients undergoing second-trimester abortions receive more
education prior to viewing to prepare them for seeing identifiable fetal
parts.” 396 This additional education may be helpful.
***
This Section picks up on the work of abortion providers who have
sought to own the uncomfortable truths about abortion for the sake of transparency and honesty. We move the conversation forward by noting how embracing abortion dangertalk in the second trimester can rebut the womanprotective rationale and improve patient care. Though this openness comes
with some risks, we argue that the benefits to abortion litigation and patient
care outweigh them. By openly discussing the particulars of second-trimester
abortion and recognizing the complexity of emotions after abortion, patients
can have more options in their care and make more informed choices. And
anti-abortion activists and states will be less able to argue that women need
protection in the form of restrictive abortion laws.
CONCLUSION
Abortion rights, especially in the second trimester, are more vulnerable
than ever. A swath of second-trimester abortion laws is likely headed for the
Supreme Court, and they all rely—at least in part—on the argument that the
laws are necessary to protect women. The uncomfortable truths associated
with second-trimester abortion, including the nature of second trimester abortion procedures and the possibility of complex emotions about the abortion,
makes the woman-protective rationale more intuitive to some. For too long,
the traditional abortion rights narrative has chosen to avoid these uncomfortable truths. In this Article, we argue that the abortion rights movement and
second trimester abortion patients would be better served by more openness
regarding the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures and the possible
range of emotional responses to the abortion. Avoidance of these dangertalk
topics only capitulates the narrative on second-trimester abortion to the antiabortion movement, who use the silence of abortion rights activists to their
advantage. On the other hand, above-and-beyond transparency on these topics will counter the woman-protective rationale and improve patient care. We
396

See id. at 508 (“The identifiable fetal body in later abortions may resemble anti-abortion imagery, so providers take extra steps to ensure the patient is prepared for the viewing
experience.”); see also Ludlow, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 45 (“We are
. . . very careful to prepare the woman for what they are going to see.”); Purcell et al., supra
note 39, at 179 (explaining that unprepared exposure to the fetus after a second-trimester abortion can be “highly distressing”).
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imagine a world in which patients are provided with additional options for
second-trimester abortion. This includes more choice over the type of procedure and the possibility of memory-making if they are experiencing complex
emotions following the abortion, including grief.

